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IOB Study

Linking Relief and Development: More than old solutions for old problems?

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Preface

Linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) is not a new subject. The 'gap', as it is called, between humanitarian aid and development is something which has been discussed by policy-makers, development practitioners and aid workers for decades. The problems and potential solutions have been articulated through different discourses, such as 'early recovery', 'disaster risk reduction' and 'resilience'. Yet, as comprehensive evaluations on for example the South-East Asia tsunami and the Haiti earthquake have shown, many fundamental challenges to linking short-term, emergency aid to longer-term, sustainable development still remain today.

In light of these discussions and in view of an upcoming evaluation of the Dutch policy on humanitarian aid, the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned a brief study on the topic focusing on recent trends and lessons learned.

The report points to the binding constraints that undermine a fluid transition and closer cooperation between relief aid and development. What challenges do policy-makers and practitioners in the field face when trying to link relief to development? How are these challenges being addressed by the current discourses on linking relief to development?

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The report not only underlines the fact that trying to link humanitarian aid to development is a multi-faceted issue, but also outlines, in a clear and concise manner, the challenges that the international aid and development communities face. Linking acute and chronic humanitarian assistance to reconstruction and development requires finding commonalities in the principles behind relief and development work. However, it also entails creating possibilities to effectively and efficiently fund necessary intermediate and longer-term aid. Another challenge is how to ensure sufficient public support in donor countries not only for funding emergency aid, but continuing to fund the recovery and further development once the crisis has abated or ended. Yet, also at a different level, more needs to be done to bring humanitarian aid workers and development practitioners closer together and approach the intrinsic relations between acute humanitarian aid and development interventions in a more holistic manner.

The study involved an analysis of evaluation and research reports, as well as interviews with a range of experts from donor countries, NGOs, UN agencies and the European Commission. The synthesis character of the study has allowed the authors to cover the most important recent trends and discussions on the topic. This report not only serves as a basis for the preparation of upcoming evaluations of humanitarian aid, but also to the further development of the concept of LRRD.

Thanks must go, first and foremost, to the authors of the report, Ralf Otto and Lioba Weingärtner of Channel Research Belgium. They did not only capture in a practical manner the various obstacles related to LRRD. They also proved to be strong facilitators, encouraging participants from different backgrounds to come together and share ideas.

A workshop was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which a number of experts from NGOs, the Ministry, the UN and the EU assembled to discuss the issue and the preliminary conclusions of the study. IOB would like to thank the workshop participants who through their active involvement and open attitude provided an extra 'layer of knowledge' that was tapped by the authors. Furthermore, thanks are due to all those who responded to the interviews undertaken as part of this study.

This report is meant to serve as a public document and IOB sincerely hopes that it will encourage further dialogue on the topic, as well as function as a steppingstone for upcoming evaluations on humanitarian action and reconstruction.

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List of abbreviations

| | |
|-------|---|
| ACAPS | The Assessment Capacities Project |
| ACP | African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States |
| ACT | Action of Churches Together Alliance |
| AGIR | <i>Alliance Globale pour l'Initiative Résilience au Sahel</i> (Global Alliance for the Resilience Initiative in the Sahel) |
| ALNAP | Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action |
| BMZ | <i>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung</i> (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) |
| CAP | Consolidated Appeals Process |
| CERF | Central Emergency Response Fund |
| CHASE | Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department |
| CHF | Common Humanitarian Fund(s) |
| CWGER | Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD) |
| DEC | Disaster Emergence Committee |
| DEVCO | Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid |
| DFID | Department for International Development |
| DG | Directorate-General |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| DRR | Disaster Risk Reduction |
| EC | European Commission |
| ECHO | European Community Humanitarian Office (Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection) |
| EDF | European Development Fund |
| EEAS | European External Action Service |
| EU | European Union |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| FSTP | Food Security Thematic Programme |
| GHD | Good Humanitarian Donorship |
| HAC | Humanitarian Assistance Committee |
| HAP | Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International |
| HPG | Humanitarian Policy Group |
| HQ | Headquarters |
| IASC | Inter-Agency Standing Committee |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IDS | Institute of Development Studies |
| IFRC | International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies |
| INCAF | International Network on Conflict and Fragility |
| IOB | Policy and Operations Evaluation Department |
| JHDF | Joint humanitarian-development framework |
| LRRD | Linking relief, rehabilitation and development |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |

List of abbreviations

| | |
|--------|---|
| MDTFs | Multi-Donor Trust Funds |
| NATF | Needs Assessment Taskforce |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| OCHA | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| PSNP | Productive Safety Net Programme |
| REGLAP | Regional Learning and Advocacy Programme for Vulnerable Dryland Communities |
| SHARE | Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience |
| SHO | Cooperating Aid Agencies (<i>Samenwerkende Hulp Organisaties</i>) |
| SOHS | State of the Humanitarian Systems |
| UK | United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| URD | Groupe Urgence, Réhabilitation, Développement (independent institute which specializes in the analysis of practices and the development of policy for the humanitarian and post-crisis sectors) |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| WFP | World Food Programme |

Summary

1. Introduction

The need to link relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) has been discussed for decades. LRRD is regularly a central assessment area in humanitarian evaluations. Systematic research based on experiences in the field has been undertaken widely in relation to the 2004 South-East Asia tsunami.

At the same time, there is little updated analysis available on LRRD that is linked to the most recent trends and challenges in the humanitarian aid sector and development cooperation. The objectives of this research are thus twofold:

- > The **main objective** of the study is to present a concise ‘state-of-the-art’ study on LRRD that contributes to the preparation of any upcoming humanitarian policy or programme evaluation.
- > A **secondary objective** is to further the development of the concept of LRRD in order to respond to today’s challenges in this field.

Given the main objective, this study takes humanitarian aid as the starting point. It focuses on its links to rehabilitation and development cooperation. The study concentrates mainly on those aspects that are relevant to linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development without being limited to LRRD in its ‘traditional’ or ‘linear’ sense. The analysis does not include other policy fields, such as peacebuilding and peacekeeping, that will be described as contextual issues influencing LRRD.

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The study largely builds on existing evaluations and research.¹ It combined desk research with selected interviews and a facilitated expert meeting.² One of the drawbacks of the research is that it mainly takes the headquarters’ (HQ) perspective. Those affected by humanitarian crises and involved in interventions at field level were not consulted directly. Evaluation reports, other field research and the interviews with experts who have field experience however, cover the field perspective to some extent.

2. The problem statement: Why are we discussing LRRD?

Humanitarian aid does not take place in isolated environments. People affected by humanitarian crises have either already been beneficiaries of development interventions or clearly have needs that go beyond immediate-response, life-saving aid and the replacement of the assets lost in the humanitarian crisis. This is true for most types of crises, sudden-onset and protracted crises, as well as natural disasters, conflict related disasters and combinations of both in complex and often protracted humanitarian crises. Long-term

¹ See annex 2 for the bibliography.

² 23 interviews in person and by phone and 17 workshop participants, see annex 3 for details.

poverty, state fragility and extensive humanitarian needs often occur concurrently and are inter-related.

The international response must take this into account. Humanitarian and rehabilitation aid, as well as development cooperation, need to be provided accordingly. Humanitarian aid should, at the very least, not undermine any efforts to improve sustainable living conditions or existing capacities. Humanitarian aid should be linked to ongoing or to subsequent development processes and should not take place in isolation.

Development cooperation needs to react quickly to often volatile and abruptly changing conditions in crisis situations. Depending on country contexts, development cooperation may be affected by humanitarian crisis. Development cooperation is, however, often too insensitive to acute shocks.

3. History of LRRD and recent trends in the humanitarian sector with relevance for LRRD

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The debate about LRRD dates back to the 1980s. Milestones in the history of LRRD are the European Commission (EC) Communications on LRRD from 1996 and 2001, the inclusion of LRRD into the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principles in 2003 and the comprehensive systematic assessments of LRRD related to the response to the South-East Asia tsunami. Recently the debate has been influenced by discussions relating to concepts and responses in fragile states, disaster risk reduction (DRR), early recovery and resilience.

While concepts first aimed at filling ‘the gap’ between relief, rehabilitation and development, there was later a greater awareness of the complexity of the challenges. Potential negative effects of humanitarian aid on development processes were recognised and the focus of the debate partly shifted to increased demands on what humanitarian aid should achieve. Beyond life-saving, humanitarian aid should be supportive of recovery and long-term development. In order to achieve this development the way of delivering humanitarian aid needs to be adapted.

4. Main challenges for good linkages between relief and development

A long list of challenges for good linkages can easily be established. One central challenge is the lack of clarity of concepts and definitions. Neither the term LRRD nor the policy areas relief, rehabilitation and development are clearly defined or commonly understood. Furthermore, there is sometimes a lack of clarity regarding the problem statement, which has practical implications. LRRD is reduced to the need to ‘fill the gap’ between different phases of assistance. The need to provide humanitarian assistance in a way that is ‘supportive of recovery and long-term development’ and the fact that humanitarian aid can be harmful to development processes are not always recognised.

A second central challenge is the existence of the dual worlds of development cooperation and humanitarian aid ('two worlds apart'). The two policy areas are characterised by different working cultures, different principles and values, and different languages, as well as by different working rhythms and speeds.

The differences in working principles and mandates of humanitarian and development actors ('the principles challenge') are challenging. This is not solely a theoretical problem. Being committed to the principles - humanitarian imperative, independence, impartiality, humanity and neutrality - has practical implications regarding the way of working that is very different from the value-based way of working in development cooperation. Working with the humanitarian principles in particular has practical implications when it comes to engagement with state actors.

A third central challenge is the expectation that humanitarian actors 'fix the problem' quickly. Humanitarian actors are accountable for saving lives and short-term solutions. They have few incentives to think about problems that are beyond their core responsibility. The fact that humanitarian aid can often deliver (visible) results in a shorter time frame is one of the reasons why there is frequently more agreement about the provision of humanitarian aid than there is for development aid or peacebuilding interventions.

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5. LRRD concepts, capacities and mechanisms

Today, there is, in general terms, no lack of policy commitments and concepts that address the challenges of linking relief and development. The EC LRRD approach, Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), early recovery and transition (from conflict/war to peace) are four important concepts. The centre of attention of the debate today has however clearly shifted to the concept of resilience, where, according to interviews, some see the highest potential for strong linkages between relief and development. While these concepts certainly have their merits, their effective application at country level is the central question. It must also be noted that none of them address all challenges related to the LRRD debate.

Rarely are there LRRD specific instruments or budget lines. Among informants within this study there was a broad agreement that LRRD specific instruments or budget lines would in fact be counter-productive. Instead, there are efforts to link and to adapt the instruments for humanitarian aid, for development cooperation and for stability. Flexibility in the use of different funding instruments however is still a challenge. Flexibility with regards to already allocated funds or mechanisms within instruments or programmes seem to work better. There are also efforts for more multi-annual funding for humanitarian aid. Longer-term funding is expected to give implementing organisations more flexibility and a time perspective that goes beyond the annual project cycle. Both are supposed to allow for better linkages between relief and development.

So far, there are neither specific guidelines nor specific tools for LRRD, while there are core operational principles for resilience. These stress the focus on ownership and long-term

approaches as well as integrated approaches and selected interventions based on criteria. Guidelines for donors exist for engagement in fragile states and also for transition financing in these contexts. These guidelines have high potential for guiding approaches favouring LRRD. The guidelines can however lead to conflicts with the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality: the guidelines ask for integrated approaches in conflict settings.

6. Approaches favouring LRRD

Improving joint work, e.g. in needs assessment and programming, and coordination in order to overcome the above-described challenge of the ‘two worlds apart’ has been central in the LRRD debate for a long time. Despite this acknowledgement, there are usually no coordination frameworks at country level that integrate the different national and international actors and the policy fields and parallel structures that exist. Recent organisational changes and coordination efforts at agencies’ and donors’ headquarters are expected to facilitate coordination between the different policy fields.

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Context and needs assessment processes have the potential to create good linkages between the different policy fields. First, by integrating long-term perspectives, and second by bringing national and international actors from the different policy fields together in these processes. There are efforts to increase collaboration on joint needs assessments. In general, the humanitarian sector is still weak at analysing contexts appropriately and comprehensively.

Moving from thematic policy fields and centrally managed instruments to joint country programming with decision-making at country level is potentially another way of overcoming the ‘two worlds apart’. In a few cases, a shift to decision-making at country level is currently taking place within existing mechanisms.

There are efforts to increase longer-term commitments beyond the short-term humanitarian response. Examples of regional programming with significant budgets exist. There is an increase in funding for recovery efforts and for long-term programming in protracted crises. Current funding schemes, however, are not adequate, as they do not allow the organisations to work flexibly over the entire programme period. Multi-mandated agencies (humanitarian and development mandates) note the restrictions on the use of funding in rapid-onset crises. Short-term emergency response funding is still prioritised over long-term rehabilitation funding.

Experiences from the past indicate that at least in contexts without conflicts or state fragility, linkages have been most successful when the state was able to set clear policies and establish a coordinating presence in the disaster-affected region. This has been reconfirmed recently in Ethiopia.

There are also increased efforts in integrated approaches. It is, however, difficult to determine to what extent multi-sector integrated programmes actually exist and to what extent they have ultimately supported linkages that address the identified challenges.

7. Assessment areas for upcoming humanitarian policy evaluations

In order to analyse LRRD more comprehensively and in-depth in humanitarian policy evaluations, four assessment areas are proposed.

Policy commitment to LRRD, guidelines and procedures

The commitment to policy is, in general, not the problem. The question, therefore, is to address how the policy commitment is articulated and understood and how the commitment is subsequently translated into appropriate action. The main issues are:

- To what extent do the actors commonly understand the need and the challenges to appropriately link relief, rehabilitation and development?
- Is there a common understanding of good linkages in the sense that humanitarian assistance should be provided in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development? Are the positive as well as the potentially harmful results from humanitarian aid activities analysed, monitored and acted upon?
- In which policies, strategies, guidelines, practices and procedures is this understanding clearly reflected? To what extent are these guidelines, practices and procedures applied?
- How is the 'principle challenge' addressed?

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Capacities and mechanisms supporting good linkages between relief and development

Capacities and mechanisms need to be aligned with the policy commitment to LRRD. Secondly, working with national and international implementing partners can enhance good linkages between relief and development. The implementing partners need to have the relevant capacities for ensuring LRRD. Funding mechanisms need to be designed for good linkages between relief and development. The main issues are:

- What are the implementing partners' capacities for ensuring good linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development? Are local partners involved in decision-making? Are partner capacities for LRRD part of the context and needs assessments?
- What structures and working procedures are in place to support good linkages between relief and development?
- To what extent do funding mechanisms support good linkages between relief and development? Do they allow for longer-term perspectives? Do they allow funding to local actors? What flexibility mechanisms and contingency mechanisms are integrated?

Processes and approaches supporting good linkages between relief and development

LRRD needs to be integrated and taken into account when implementing projects or programmes that start with needs assessments and end with performance assessment. Issues to be pursued are:

- To what extent do needs assessments and context analyses take longer-term perspectives into account?
- To what extent does decision-making take place at country level?
- To what extent do integrated multi-sector approaches exist?
- Is LRRD part of the performance assessment at all stages of the project cycle (programme proposals, implementation, reporting, monitoring and evaluation)? Is the evaluation criterion 'connectedness' used in evaluations commissioned by Dutch humanitarian policy actors?
- To what extent are appropriate exit strategies for humanitarian assistance in place and implemented?

Results and impacts of policy commitments to LRRD are to be questioned as follows:

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- To what extent have the policy commitments regarding LRRD been achieved?
- To what extent does funding of humanitarian assistance support good linkages to rehabilitation and development?
- How does this 'linking' contribute to the improvement of the livelihoods of people affected by humanitarian crises?

8. Conclusions

Since the late 1990s, the challenge to link relief to development has been discussed with little progressive development. New trends in the humanitarian aid sector and new concepts address some relevant aspects for the debate about LRRD and respective action at field level. Still, 'old solutions' are proposed for 'old problems' in many cases.

There is no shortage of policy commitments, debates and concepts for linking relief to development. At the same time, there is little concrete knowledge about what works and what does not work best in terms of the linkages for those who are affected by a humanitarian crisis. Some challenges in linking relief to development are still not addressed by existing policies and concepts.

A number of programme elements are expected to favour linkages between relief and development, especially long-term engagement, integrated approaches, joint country programming, and the support of local ownership and the central role of the host government. However, these elements have not yet been applied widely in humanitarian aid and there is little concrete knowledge about the specific results when it comes to the linkages to development.

One of the key challenges of linking relief and development is to overcome the ‘two worlds apart’. The challenge is to improve collaboration, coordination and communication. Despite many efforts and resources invested in these areas, new and innovative forms of collaboration, coordination and communication that go beyond business as usual are still very rare. Additionally, there are neither frameworks nor specific initiatives that initiate or promote such new or innovative forms of collaboration.

It is a crucial challenge for humanitarian actors to remain committed to humanitarian principles and at the same time to take development and political dimensions in international cooperation into account. This requires a more thorough knowledge of how to best engage with state actors without compromising commitments to independence and neutrality.

More mutual exchange among key actors about the specificities and challenges of ‘the two worlds’ and more focus on existing common interests and commonalities between relief and development could foster joint action. Communalities are mostly to be found at country level, often localised and close to the target populations.



1

Introduction

1.1 Rationale and objective of the study

The need to link relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) has been discussed for decades. LRRD is commonly a central assessment area in humanitarian evaluations. Systematic research based on experiences in the field has been undertaken widely in relation to the 2004 South-East Asia tsunami. There is, however, little information available on the topic related to the most recent trends and challenges in the humanitarian aid sector. The Haiti earthquake, the Pakistan flood, the Horn of Africa crisis and the Sahel food crisis are all contexts in which the issue of LRRD is highly relevant. This study intends to systematically capture the knowledge from recent studies and evaluations about LRRD.

The objectives of this research are thus twofold:

- The **main objective** of the study is to present a concise ‘state-of-the-art’ paper on LRRD that contributes to the preparation of any upcoming humanitarian policy or programme evaluation.
- A **secondary objective** is to contribute to the further development of the concept of LRRD in order to respond to today’s challenges in this field.

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This report intends to inform and to contribute to the design of the Terms of Reference (ToR) of any future humanitarian aid policy or programme evaluation. Based on this report, the evaluation assessment areas relating to LRRD can be categorically defined. The systematic assessment of recent evaluations and research is an important opportunity to present and discuss the ‘state-of-the-art’ LRRD related to today’s challenges.

1.2 Scope and approach

Given the main objective of this study, this background report takes humanitarian aid as the starting point. It focuses on links of humanitarian aid to development cooperation. The study concentrates mainly on those aspects that are relevant to linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development without being limited to LRRD in its ‘traditional’ or ‘linear’ sense.

This background report mainly addresses the role of humanitarian actors (humanitarian donor departments, national and international implementing and coordinating agencies) and concentrates on their policies, concepts, practices and performance in terms of LRRD. The analysis does not include other policy fields. These policy fields will however be described as contextual issues influencing LRRD, such as peacebuilding and peacekeeping. It is not the objective of this study to address policy coherence for these other fields or to capture best practices on comprehensive approaches. The latter is a different debate.

The study largely builds on existing evaluations and research.³ It combined desk research with interviews with selected resource persons and with a structured and guided meeting of experts.⁴ Donor representatives, non-governmental organisation (NGO) and United Nations (UN) staff as well as independent researchers attended the expert meeting and contributed through this forum.⁵

1.3 Limitations

One of the challenges encountered during the research conducted was the lack of clarity in the terminology used. This obscurity was particularly prohibiting in the case of terms such as humanitarian assistance, transition and LRRD. The study does not aim to clarify them. Where relevant it is stated how terms are used for the purpose of this study.⁶ The time limitation imposed on the study was another challenge faced by the authors. The debate around LRRD concerns diverse topics. Not all of them were addressed in the study given these aforementioned boundaries. The study therefore concentrates on those aspects that have been addressed widely and most prominently in the literature and interviews.

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The central limitation of this study is that it mainly takes the perspective of people at headquarters (HQ). Interviews were only undertaken in Europe and those affected by humanitarian crises and involved in interventions at field level were not consulted directly. A number of sources consulted for this research (evaluations, other field research and expert opinions) reflect the field perspective to some extent.

1.4 The problem statement: Why are we discussing LRRD?

Humanitarian assistance does not happen in isolated environments. People affected by humanitarian crises are living in contexts where national policies, strategies or programmes often are in place; development cooperation has already supported people and organisations. People affected by humanitarian crises have either already been beneficiaries of development interventions or clearly have needs that go beyond life-saving assistance and the replacement of the assets and possessions lost in the humanitarian crises. This is true for most categories of crises, sudden-onset and protracted crises as well as natural disasters and conflict-related disasters, and combinations of these, in complex humanitarian crises.

A family affected by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, for example, was already living in poverty in a conflict-affected, fragile context before the earthquake occurred. People affected by the 2012/2013 outbreaks of violence in Mali or in Eastern DR Congo have lived in a neglected part of the country with little infrastructure, insufficient service provision and with poor

³ See the bibliography in annex 2.

⁴ 23 interviews in person and by phone and 17 workshop participants; see annex 3 for details.

⁵ For further details about the methodology see annex 3.

⁶ See box 2 in chapter 2.1.

living conditions for many years. Families in Niger suffer from chronic food and nutrition insecurity in a fragile state environment aggravated by acute droughts and the impact of regional security crises combined with refugee influx. If these people had assets to begin with, they might lose them due to the crises. If these people had self-help capacities before the crisis, their coping strategies and traditional support structures get overstretched through the severity, recurrence and scope of the crises.

These families need humanitarian assistance in order to ensure their survival and their basic human dignity. They are also in need of support that goes far beyond immediate assistance following catastrophic events. These families need external support so that they can return to the same standard of living as before, and ideally to an even better situation. Such support is provided through medium to long-term development cooperation.

Humanitarian assistance should not undermine any efforts of sustainably improving living conditions or existing capacities. Humanitarian aid should be linked to ongoing or to subsequent development processes and should not take place in isolation. Development cooperation needs to react quickly to often volatile and suddenly changing conditions in a crisis situation. Depending on country contexts, development cooperation may be affected by humanitarian crises. Development cooperation is, however, often too insensitive to acute shocks.

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The linkages between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation need to be discussed and addressed through appropriate action. They need to be integrated into all humanitarian assistance and development cooperation activities in all countries or regions that are affected and/or at risk of humanitarian crises.

Box 1 *Example from South Sudan*

‘(...) enormous challenges remain, and humanitarian and development actors face multiple, competing priorities: meeting emergency humanitarian needs; strengthening community resilience; addressing the underlying drivers of conflict; promoting the development of sustainable livelihoods; ensuring that humanitarian and development assistance promote equitable development; supporting the government to protect vulnerable groups; strengthening civil society; and ensuring uninterrupted service delivery while simultaneously strengthening national institutions and ultimately empowering the government to assume responsibility for meeting the needs of its citizens.’⁷

⁷ Oxfam (2011), page 3.



2

History of LRRD and recent trends in the humanitarian sector with relevance for LRRD

2.1 Short history of LRRD

The debate about LRRD dates back to the 1980s. It evolved in relation to the food crisis in Africa. The increasing number of conflicts and long lasting crises in Africa brought about a debate that addressed the different kinds and the most appropriate type of assistance necessary.⁸

The European Commission (EC) developed the term 'Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development' in two official communications about LRRD; exit strategies and the timing for phasing out humanitarian assistance (1996 and 2001).⁹ Most actors subsequently used the term. The EC's starting point for the concept was the recognition that a number of different funding mechanisms are available for the EC's relations with developing countries:

'(...) This reconfirmation of the comprehensive "toolbox" of different instruments available for our relations with developing countries over the coming years, requires that they are not dealt with in isolation but that a coordinated approach to their management is adopted in order to strengthen linkages between them (...).'¹⁰

The first EC Communication on LRRD in 1996 introduced the following continuum: relief is followed by rehabilitation and later by development. In this first EC Communication about LRRD, doubts about the linear view of LRRD arose. A footnote referring to the term 'continuum' was included: 'It has been suggested that the term 'contiguuum' would be more appropriate, reflecting the fact that operations in relief, rehabilitation and development may all be on-going simultaneously within any given country.'¹¹

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The 1996 EC Communication concludes: 'Better "development" can reduce the need for emergency relief; better "relief" can contribute to development; and better "rehabilitation" can ease the transition between the two.'¹² The EC calls for the integration of disaster preparedness in long-term development programming. A task force for the coordination of development aid and humanitarian aid was introduced internally.

The 2001 EC Communication confirms the 1996 statements.¹³ Influenced by the concept of 'do no harm' in the 1990s¹⁴, the 2001 EC Communication additionally highlights the possible 'negative and potentially distorting effects of prolonged humanitarian aid, such as the creation of dependency and the fuelling of tension'.¹⁵ The Communication suggests that the EC Directorate in charge of humanitarian assistance, DG ECHO, should focus on its 'core mandate', meaning life-saving interventions in emergencies, which aim for the earliest

⁸ Buchanan-Smith, M. and Maxwell, S. (1994), page 2.

⁹ EC (1996) and EC (2001).

¹⁰ EC (1996).

¹¹ EC (1996), page ii.

¹² EC (1996), page iii.

¹³ EC (2001), page 3.

¹⁴ For details regarding the Do-No-Harm Project see www.cdainc.com.

¹⁵ EC (2001), page 9.

possible exit. This should be combined with ‘a co-ordinated and progressive transition from humanitarian aid to normal co-operation instruments’.¹⁶

The Communication differentiates between emergencies related to conflict and those related to natural disasters. For the latter, the EC sees room for a linear approach, whereas for conflict related emergencies it is concluded that the ‘transition from relief / humanitarian aid to development co-operation is rarely a linear chronological process’.¹⁷ The Communication acknowledges the need for a broader view and suggests integrated approaches, in particular through disaster preparedness but also mentions conflict resolution and a contribution to structural stability.

Box 2 Terminology

Commonly accepted definitions of relief, rehabilitation or development do not exist. This is one of the challenges in this debate. The same applies for the term ‘LRRD’ itself, which is often no longer used as it is perceived as reinforcing linear thinking.

The use of the term ‘**transition**’ instead of LRRD is not without its problems. On the one hand the term is colloquially used to describe a crossing or the transit from one phase to another. At the same time it stands for a concept developed by the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).¹⁸

For the purpose of this study the term LRRD is maintained as it reflects the scope of the study, which is about the policy fields humanitarian aid, rehabilitation and development.

This report uses the term ‘linkage’. When speaking of ‘good linkages’ between relief and development, the authors refer to linkages that address the challenges that are described in section 4. A similar term is the evaluation criterion ‘connectedness’.¹⁹

Even if the term LRRD was not used throughout, the idea of linking humanitarian assistance to rehabilitation and to development was generally accepted at that time. This is demonstrated by the inclusion of the concept in the list of the 23 principles and good practice of humanitarian donorship (‘GHD principles’) in 2003.²⁰

¹⁶ EC (2001), page 9.

¹⁷ EC (2001), page 5.

¹⁸ OECD DAC INCAF (2011) and OECD DAC (2011), page 29.

¹⁹ Connectedness refers to the need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account. ALNAP (2003), page 38.

²⁰ Agreed in a meeting in Stockholm attended by 16 donor governments, the EC, the OECD, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, NGOs, and academics.

Box 3 *GHD Principle 9*

‘Provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities.’²¹

Following the South-East Asia tsunami in 2004, LRRD was the central interest in the efforts to analyse the international response. Donors invested in comprehensive systematic assessments of LRRD within the framework of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition.²² The studies concluded that the main question concerning relevant and effective linkages is less about ‘relief’ versus ‘rehabilitation’ or ‘development’, but rather about the proper choice of partners and the scope of work (long-term engagement).²³

Another milestone is the confirmed commitment to LRRD at European level in the 2007 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid: ‘Achieving better linkage between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development requires humanitarian and development actors to coordinate from the earliest phases of a crisis response and to act in parallel with a view to ensuring a smooth transition.’²⁴

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2.2 Most important recent trends in international assistance with importance for LRRD

a) Increased attention for fragile states and on the concept of transition

With the increased attention of the international community for fragile states in the past decade, the focus has shifted from linking relief and development to integrating international aid (including humanitarian assistance), development and security. Some ask for coherence between security, development and humanitarian assistance in certain fragile contexts. Under such conditions, humanitarian actors see their independence and neutrality threatened.

Donors introduced the ‘whole of government approach’, involving government departments responsible for security, political and economic affairs but also those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance.²⁵ In some contexts the humanitarian and the security actors are the only international presence in the field (e.g. Darfur, Somalia, Northern Mali and Niger). The UN integrated missions became standard

²¹ www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org.

²² First in 2005 to 2007 and then in 2009 with the follow up evaluation: Brusset, E. et al. (2006); Buchanan-Smith, M. and Fabbri, P. (2005); Christoplos, I (2006); Brusset, E. et al. (2009). For the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition see <http://www.alnap.org/ourwork/tec.aspx>.

²³ Brusset, E. et al. (2009), page 115; see also annex 7 for further details.

²⁴ EU Consensus on humanitarian aid, paragraph 77.

²⁵ OECD DAC (2007); OECD DAC (2011a).

practice in many conflict settings. A number of policy commitments and guidelines for engagement in fragile states have been developed (see later chapter 5.3).

b) Disaster Preparedness, Disaster Risk Reduction

Disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction (DRR) have been discussed since the years 1970.²⁶ In terms of humanitarian assistance, the topic moved high up the agenda following the South-East Asia tsunami in 2004 and the World Conference on Disaster Reduction and Hyogo Framework for Action in 2005. Today there is a wide agreement on the need for DRR. At the same time, DRR does not receive the expected allocations in terms of funding.²⁷

DRR creates a link between humanitarian and development cooperation by advocating for a focus on risks through external shocks when implementing development cooperation. The concept is commonly applied in the context of natural disasters only and not in conflict contexts. For humanitarian aid this approach means pro-active action rather than reactive action, e.g. building response capacities and doing contingency planning. The DRR approach focuses on planning, partners and capacities.²⁸

c) Early recovery

The concept of early recovery is today associated with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Early recovery as a concept was introduced through the humanitarian reform process that began in 2005.²⁹ The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER), led by UNDP, was set up with the objective of promoting opportunities for recovery in humanitarian settings.

Early recovery focuses on restoration of basic services and on the social, political and economic fabric of a society. Early recovery applies development principles to a humanitarian setting. The concept emphasises national ownership, capacity building and participation.

At country level, UNDP provides human resources in order to integrate early recovery approaches into humanitarian programming (Early Recovery Advisors). In some countries, clusters related to early recovery have been created.³⁰

d) Resilience

One recent trend with relevance to humanitarian aid and the LRRD debate is the focus on resilience. Resilience has already been discussed in international aid since the 1960s.³¹ In the

²⁶ The topic also received high-level attention when from 1990-1999 the UN General Assembly declared this decade as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, UN General Assembly A/RES/44/236, 85th plenary meeting, 22 December 1989.

²⁷ Sparks, D. (2012), page 5.

²⁸ See DEC (2012), page 16 for an example where agencies could scale up existing developmental programmes to respond to an emergency. Existing development programmes included emergency contingency reserves.

²⁹ www.undp.org.

³⁰ E.g. the Community Restoration Cluster in Pakistan in 2011.

³¹ IDS (2012), page 8.

humanitarian sector, resilience has been high on the agenda since 2008. Today, there is a very high-level policy commitment to the concept internationally.³²

The resilience approach focuses on the ability of countries, communities, households and individuals to resist, to recover from, or to adapt to the effects of shocks or stresses.³³ Resilience can potentially serve as an overarching common goal and analytical framework for different policy fields such as DRR, climate change adaptation, peacebuilding, social protection, development aid and humanitarian response. There is – at least in theory – a direct link between humanitarian aid and development cooperation in the sense that a humanitarian crisis, and ultimately a humanitarian response, can be avoided by developing resilience. Some interlocutors in this study see resilience as a good entry point for integrated programming and cross-sector dialogue.³⁴ There are some ongoing case studies about the application of the resilience approach, mainly in drought-related contexts.³⁵ The OECD calls for better documentation of existing innovations and good practices in this area, including country case studies.³⁶

e) Further trends

Other recent trends potentially have relevance for the LRRD debate:

- A continuous trend has emerged over the past years that the largest part of humanitarian funding goes to long-lasting (protracted), conflict-related humanitarian crises mainly in Africa.³⁷
- Climate change adaptation has been discussed extensively within development contexts and only indirectly within the humanitarian aid sector, mainly within the DRR, displacement ('climate displaced or refugees' has become a new category for displaced persons³⁸) and recently within the resilience debate.
- The use of cash transfers and/or vouchers in humanitarian aid instead of asset replacement has increasingly been discussed over the past years.³⁹ The use of cash transfers instead of distributing relief items such as food or household assets regularly appears in resilience concepts and policies as one way of enhancing resilience.⁴⁰
- In drought-related contexts there is an increased shift to growth-oriented development efforts rather than focussing on livelihoods in humanitarian programming.⁴¹

³² DFID (2011); see also the jointly established US-UK Resilience Political Champions Group at ministerial level. The OECD has published specific guidance for donors and other actors.

³³ USAID (2011), DFID (2011).

³⁴ DFID (2011), page 10.

³⁵ USAID (2011), DFID (2011).

³⁶ OECD (2013).

³⁷ ALNAP (2012), page 36.

³⁸ <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49eqa5096.html> (accessed in March 2013).

³⁹ Harvey, P. and Bailey, S. (2011); Bailey, S. and Hedlund, K. (2012).

⁴⁰ DFID (2011), pages 10 and 12; BMZ (2013), page 13.

⁴¹ Christoplos, I.; et al. (2012).

- The past years have seen an increased use of pooled funding in humanitarian assistance.⁴² Working through pooled funds that are managed at country level opens new opportunities for coordination among humanitarian actors and for coordination of humanitarian actors with non-humanitarian actors. Common funds are also used for recovery and reconstruction (e.g. the Sudan Recovery Fund for Southern Sudan).
- Over the past few years civil protection has played an increasing role at European level.⁴³ The EU civil protection mechanism has been activated in crisis contexts that were also humanitarian contexts (e.g. Haiti, Libya and Syria). Civil protection potentially becomes another policy field that is or needs to be linked to humanitarian assistance.
- NGO networks, coordination and joint fundraising bodies as well as NGO consortia and larger humanitarian programmes are on the rise.⁴⁴ This creates the potential for better coordination, increased flexibility in the use of funds within such mechanisms and programmes and thus for better linkages of relief to rehabilitation and development.
- The Transformative Agenda focuses on leadership and coordination, among other things.⁴⁵ Both aspects are important for LRRD (see challenges in subchapters 3.2 and 3.4).

2.3 Conclusions

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The need to link relief with rehabilitation and development has been discussed for decades. A number of concepts have been developed, which partly overlap. While first concepts aimed to fill 'the gap' between relief, rehabilitation and development, later there was a greater awareness of the complexity of the challenges involved. Potential negative effects of humanitarian aid on development processes were recognised, including that humanitarian aid should not be reduced to 'life-saving' activities only. Humanitarian aid should be supportive of rehabilitation and long-term development, which is mainly a question of how humanitarian aid is delivered.

Recent trends in humanitarian aid confirm this view on LRRD. The concept of resilience, for example, tries to align the different policy fields under one common goal. At the same time some trends add to the complexity of LRRD. The increased focus on fragile states and the interests of security policy actors to integrate all policy areas in international interventions in fragile contexts is the most prominent example of this.

⁴² E.g. the multi-donor humanitarian fund for DR Congo established in 2006 and the Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund established in 2005; ALNAP (2012), page 38.

⁴³ In 2010 the EU civil protection mechanism has been integrated into DG ECHO.

⁴⁴ ALNAP (2012), pages 27 and 31.

⁴⁵ <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org>.

Box 4 *Example of problems due to inappropriate humanitarian aid (Haiti)*

In January 2010 a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Port-au-Prince, Haiti. About 230,000 persons were killed and 300,000 injured. National and international aid agencies and military personnel immediately provided emergency medical and health-related assistance. Additional medical assets were moved into the area.

‘This increased capacity helped to ease the burden on overwhelmed medical systems. While this initial response was important to save lives, the Haitian Government’s decision to only allow the provision of free health care severely undermined the ability of local providers to make a living and many left Port-au-Prince and Haiti.

The deployment of many specialized and surgical assets led to a number of amputations and complex operative procedures. This created the problem of long-term care for post-operative Haitians. Guidance as to the applicable standards of care and processes for making decisions about standards of care was not provided consistently (...). Medical personnel on the ground were not adequately prepared to practice in accordance with local and catastrophic standards of care, and the response lacked a unified approach with regard to the standard of care provided.’⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Guha-Sapir, D., et al. (2011), page 26.



3

Main challenges for linking relief, rehabilitation and development

The debate on LRRD over the past decades and the recent trends in humanitarian assistance demonstrate how complex the topic is. Appropriately linking relief, rehabilitation and development is certainly not an easy task. Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell in their analytical assessment of the LRRD debate and practice called for a close examination of the ‘underlying obstacles and analytical issues, which beset the topic’.⁴⁷

A long list of challenges for good LRRD can easily be established. Annex 4 shows a matrix that lists the various identified challenges for linking relief, rehabilitation and development. The list has been established mainly based on desk research (literature and evaluations). The matrix then refers to key concepts and approaches addressing LRRD (e.g. DRR, Resilience, Early Recovery and OECD DAC Guidelines on fragile states and transition). The matrix shows to what extent these concepts respond to the identified challenges. The matrix can thus demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of each concept. Gaps can be identified.

The challenges are numerous and can consequently be perceived as discouraging for the debate.⁴⁸ A few challenges can be identified as central and are worth exploring: the challenge on concepts and definitions, the challenge of the ‘two worlds apart’ and the ‘quick fix challenge’. These challenges are discussed in this chapter.

| Table 1 | Challenges |
|--|---|
| I. Challenge of concepts and definitions | |
| 1. | Definition challenge: What is humanitarian assistance/relief, what is rehabilitation, what is development; when does the one start and the other end; what is the ‘link’ or the ‘transition’. |
| 2. | The general concept challenge: Little understanding of the LRRD concept; continuum thinking still prominent and too little understanding of requirements for contiguuum. |
| II. Challenge of separated worlds | |
| 3. | The ‘two worlds’ challenge: Different mandates, different working cultures, mentalities, different speed, different ‘languages’, no common discussion platforms, insufficient understanding of the respective other ‘world’; humanitarian aid is often asset replacement (technocratic approach to development). |
| 4. | The principles challenge: Challenge to discuss humanitarian aid with its principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality in the discussion around ‘whole-of-government approach’; aid effectiveness principles with focus on governance vs. GHD principles (incl. humanitarian principles). |
| 5. | The partner challenge: Working with the government vs. working around the government (if the government is part of the problem). |
| 6. | The imperative challenge: Humanitarian imperative ‘forces’ agencies to intervene, even if humanitarian aid interventions undermine development efforts; risks of aid dependency and humanitarian aid undermining development efforts: working in ‘emergency mode’ for too long (substitution rather than empowering/enabling). |

⁴⁷ Buchanan-Smith, M. and Maxwell, S. (1994), page 2.

⁴⁸ The OECD has published a paper on incentives for donors working with the resilience approach. It also deals with challenges that are partly in line with the list presented in this report and partly goes beyond. OECD (2013).

7. **The needs assessment challenge:** Different assessment and planning processes in development cooperation and in humanitarian assistance. Lack of common/joint context and needs analysis. Requirement for multi-actor and multi-sector assessments.
8. **The joint framework challenge:** Lack of a joint or common strategic framework for development cooperation, reconstruction and humanitarian aid; multitude of actors (national and international), instruments and interests are difficult to align within one framework.
9. **The grey zone challenge:** No responsibilities allocated within donors and aid agencies for the interventions that are not clearly humanitarian or development ('grey zone'). Without allocated responsibilities no action.

III. Challenge of fast solutions

10. **The quick fix challenge:** Donor / media / public / local government push for quick results and focus on numbers.
11. **The funding challenge:** Different budget lines and instruments, also donor fatigue in case of long-lasting crises and limited funding (no single actor can cover the whole range of sectors and all needs); funding is still disproportionately focussed on first response phase in sudden-onset disasters and this drives the entire response; multitude of funding instruments.⁴⁹

IV. Other challenges

12. **The disconnect challenge:** LRRD is discussed mainly at policy level but less dealt with at field level. Bureaucracies and international organisations need to work with sector/technical specialisations and in a compartmentalised way (thematic departments, various budget lines, etc.). At field level these compartments, as well as the need to include all cross-cutting issues and comprehensive approaches, can be distracting.
13. **The exit challenge:** Lack of appropriate exit strategies for humanitarian aid, lack of follow-up of proposed exit strategies, donor interest diminishes once the crisis is no longer in the centre of (public) attention.
14. **The coordination challenge:** Lack of coordination capacities and leadership for good LRRD; multi-dimensional and very diverse multi-actor coordination in post conflict settings (national, multi-national, Trust Funds, private sector).
15. **The timing challenge:** Transition from relief to rehabilitation comes too early or too late, 'when can we enter rehabilitation and development?'; less room for individual decisions regarding timing because of the requirement for coordinated and integrated approaches; humanitarians lobby for longer stay in order to secure funding.
16. **The multi-tasking challenge:** Need to work in an interdisciplinary manner with a multi-sector approach vs. recent trend/demand in humanitarian assistance to specialise/ professionalise.
17. **The capacity challenge:** Partners' and aid agencies' mandates and capacities for good LRRD; need for expertise, staff capacity and instruments to work in both humanitarian aid and in development cooperation and to master the linkages and transition.
18. **The early warning challenge:** Early warning systems do not always function; if they function actors do not intervene early enough e.g. for asset saving (livestock).

⁴⁹ See: 'Perverse incentives from the availability of humanitarian funding', OECD (2013).

3.1 Challenge of concepts and definitions

This challenge has multiple dimensions. As described above, the term LRRD is no longer widely used. Discussions tackle DRR, resilience, transition, comprehensive or integrated approaches, flexibility and other issues. All these terms need to be defined properly and none of them alone necessarily address exactly the above-described need for linking relief, rehabilitation and development. The term transition is for example often used among donors. Transition in contrast to the term linkage reflects more strongly the linear thinking of LRRD and could reinforce an out-dated view of the topic. Furthermore, the term transition is used widely in the context of peacebuilding.⁵⁰

Box 5 *Example from the IASC Haiti evaluation (2012)*

'The lack of definition was also revealed by the general discussions and questions raised in the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) 2012 workshop, where there were mentions of the existence and need for both 'borders' and 'bridges' between the humanitarian response and recovery efforts and how far humanitarian actors should go in working on recovery, transition and capacity building.'⁵¹

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The policy areas relief, rehabilitation and development are not clearly defined nor commonly understood. What is humanitarian assistance, what is relief, what is rehabilitation, what is development? The subsequent definitions are not always clear.⁵²

Without entering too far into over-meticulous discussions about terminology, there is a lack of clarity regarding the problem statement, regarding LRRD concepts and past discussions about LRRD. Very often the discussions deal with the need to 'fill the gap'.⁵³ Sometimes this leads to the suggestion of funding 'LRRD projects or programmes' or of introducing 'LRRD coordinators' in the field. In Germany, there even is a budget line for transitional aid.⁵⁴

While it is positive that there are concrete actions taken to address the LRRD challenge, focussing primarily on the gap only addresses one part of the problem. These concepts do not respond to the need to provide humanitarian assistance in a way that is 'supportive of recovery and long-term development' (GHD Principle no. 9 – see above box 3). Focussing too much on 'the gap' could reinforce the compartmentalised thinking as the debate stresses the borders of each policy field rather than looking at each policy field for linking opportunities.

⁵⁰ See box 2.

⁵¹ Hidalgo, S. (2012), page 33.

⁵² The construction and equipment of schools for example is for some no longer relief, whereas for others it is called 'emergency education' and is funded from humanitarian budgets. See for example the humanitarian pooled funds in DR Congo.

⁵³ See for example Striffler, M. and Berman, Th. (2012), page 8; Voice (2012); case study example in Venro (2006), page 11; Morazan, P. et al. (2012), page 37.

⁵⁴ Development-oriented emergency aid until 2011 and today Entwicklungsfördernde und strukturbildende Übergangshilfe (ESÜH).

A positive example in this regard is the clear formulation chosen for the Swedish Humanitarian Assistance Policy (2010-2016): 'In reality humanitarian assistance and development cooperation are often being implemented side by side, which means it is vital that they complement and interact with one another.'⁵⁵

Box 6 *Example of LRRD in Tajikistan*

A DG ECHO commissioned evaluation was mainly concerned with questions around LRRD in its linear sense. The evaluation asked whether LRRD 'was punctual or properly implemented or handed over to the right donor/instruments' ⁵⁶. The authors however conclude 'comments on "LRRD starting late" become irrelevant because LRRD should then be applied to all projects at all times'. ⁵⁷

3.2 Development and humanitarian aid are two worlds apart

The two policy areas of development and humanitarian aid are characterised by different working cultures, different principles and values, different languages as well as by different working rhythms and speeds.⁵⁸ From a simplistic point of view, one could say that humanitarian aid is action oriented, short-term, reasonably technical, focused on external assistance rather than strengthening local capacities and based on humanitarian principles (the humanitarian imperative, humanity, independence, impartiality and neutrality)⁵⁹. Humanitarian actors are expected to solve a problem quickly, sometimes regardless of long-term implications (see also the 'quick fix challenge' in the following chapter). Development aid stresses the (government) partner approach and focuses on alleviating poverty and strengthening livelihoods in the long-term.

⁵⁵ www.government.se.

⁵⁶ Holdsworth, P., et al. (2007).

⁵⁷ Holdsworth, P., et al. (2007), page 1.

⁵⁸ See for example DEC (2012): page 13: '(...) staff who had been working on development projects like honey production did not have skills that were relevant or transferable to emergency work (...)'.

⁵⁹ Formulated in the commonly accepted Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief: The humanitarian imperative states the obligation of the international community 'to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed'. Independence means independent from government policies or actions. Neutrality means not to take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

Box 7 *Lesson from the Horn of Africa⁶⁰*

‘The separation of relief and development is both artificial and unhelpful. Not only are the recipients the same, but also the underlying causes that create the need are the same. But what often takes place, are emergency interventions that undermine development, and long term programming and investments that do not pay sufficient attention to the inevitability of drought.’


The debate on LRRD mainly exists in the humanitarian sector and is often not even known to development practitioners. Not all donors and agencies have the expertise, staff capacity and the instruments to work in both policy fields. If they do, structures are often separated and actors from the different policy fields work mainly within their own compartments.

In some crisis contexts humanitarian aid and development cooperation do not address the same needs or sectors.⁶¹ For some donor countries it is a challenge to link the two policy fields if humanitarian aid is funded in countries that are not a development partner country (as it is the case for many donor countries in the Democratic Republic of Congo).⁶²

In terms of budgets, humanitarian aid is the ‘little sister’ or the ‘little brother’ within the international aid family. According to those interviewed in this study, humanitarian aid is not discussed as much as development aid at a political level in national parliaments or in the EU parliament. It is often still perceived as straightforward and short-term, whereas development aid policies are supposed to address the ‘big issues’ that should lead to change in the long run.

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Figure 1 *Example of humanitarian and development aid funding⁶³*



⁶⁰ REGLAP (2012).

⁶¹ See for example Barham, J., et al. (2011), page 3.

⁶² This is however only a limitation if there is no other donor engaged in development cooperation in this country. Otherwise it is just a question of division of labour.

⁶³ Steets, J. (2011), page 22.

Strengthening coordination and increasing flexibility within funding instruments has been the focus of the efforts in LRRD in the past. The expectation has been that creating common fora and coordination structures are ways to overcome the two worlds apart. These efforts could, however, fail to overcome compartmentalisation at donors and aid agencies. In 2011, the European Commission (EC), for example, stated that: 'EU aid is still very fragmented, causing inefficiencies with both financial and political consequences'.⁶⁴

Humanitarian aid and development cooperation still have their own discussion fora and coordination platforms. At country level, humanitarian aid often creates its own coordination structures that work in parallel to already existing structures⁶⁵ and often bypass existing ones.

The reasons for the enduring division of the policy fields are manifold and cannot be described in absolute terms. They are related to human factors as well as to institutional aspects such as power interests and competition for funds. Cultural and institutional changes take time. They need more than statements of intent and small-scale institutional changes.

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Also challenging are the differences in working principles and mandates of humanitarian and development actors (the 'principles challenge'). Again, this is not a theoretical problem. Being committed to the humanitarian imperative and the humanitarian principles has very practical implications regarding the way of working of humanitarian actors. Working under the humanitarian imperative means that humanitarian actors need to be ready to intervene in a humanitarian context if a state is not willing or able to do so. This leads to the fact that humanitarian aid usually has a compensating or substituting character – sometimes even against the will of the local authorities and often without any contribution of the aid recipients. Bringing in substantial external capacities rather than building on what is already in place is one of the main differences between humanitarian and development aid.

⁶⁴ EC (2011), page 40.

⁶⁵ See also the next sub-chapter on joint frameworks.

Box 8 *Example for dilemmas when working with the humanitarian imperative and LRRD (Chad)*

In Chad, a humanitarian organisation entered into a partnership with the local health authorities of one area to train medical staff on nutrition issues. At first, the project included a level of substitution of local staff to treat patients combined with capacity building. Subsequently, the organisation scaled its activities down to supervision of local staff. This had been the right approach in a non-emergency period. Later when a food crisis occurred, the local medical staff was not ready to respond.⁶⁶ The humanitarian aid agency faced a dilemma. One option for the organisation was to compensate for the local authority's inactivity and thus to breach the partnership agreement. The alternative was to not intervene despite the humanitarian need.⁶⁷

The relationship between humanitarian actors and authorities is different from the (government) partner focussed approach of development aid. This makes it difficult to link one to the other. Humanitarian aid and development aid can work in the same countries and regions. The target populations can be the same. There are often the same aid agencies providing both humanitarian and development aid (multi-mandated organisations). These are potential enabling factors for good linkages between the two policy fields. The approach of working with authorities and government partners is, however, not common among humanitarian and development oriented staff members. Working with the same (government) partners is not an easy option for linking the two policy fields. The role of authorities is crucial in LRRD; this will be demonstrated later in this report.

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Box 9 *Example from Uganda⁶⁸*

'(...) DG ECHO is not a development donor and its role is not to focus exclusively on advocacy for LRRD issues, nonetheless DG ECHO has sought to overcome this through ensuring that the majority of partners within these sectors are both development and relief orientated. Many of DG ECHO's former partners will of their own accord ascertain longer-term development donors.'⁶⁹

3.3 The quick fix challenge

Humanitarian and development actors have different mandates. This means that different results are expected from them. Humanitarian actors (and increasingly also peacebuilding actors) are expected to 'fix the problem' quickly. Once this is done, the focus of attention

⁶⁶ For details regarding the context see <http://www.unocha.org/tchad/>.

⁶⁷ The case is based on an assessment that is not publicly accessible.

⁶⁸ Barham, J., et al. (2011), page 3.

⁶⁹ The Dutch NGO Oxfam/Novib also works predominantly with local partners. According to the NGO these partners are development and humanitarian actors at the same time.

shifts away to another urgent crisis (e.g. in the past years from Haiti to Pakistan, from Pakistan to the Horn of Africa, from the Horn to the Sahel region).

Providing food to those in need solves a humanitarian problem but does not prevent any re-occurrence of the crisis. The latter, however, is not the responsibility of the humanitarian actors. Their objectives are fulfilled once the mortality rate is successfully reduced; the international community will then quickly lose interest for the crisis and new 'quick fixes' will be expected elsewhere. A recent global survey among people living in recipient countries revealed the globally common finding that few ask for more aid. But many feel that 'too much' is given 'too fast'.⁷⁰ The EC's Commissioner for humanitarian assistance has recently stressed that it is easier to raise money for mega-disasters than for a concept such as resilience.⁷¹

Box 10 *Example from the IASC Haiti evaluation (2012)*

'For some humanitarian response should not be expected to address Haiti's structural problems, while others underline that there was humanitarian action in Haiti prior to the earthquake and the objective should be to follow 'build back better' approaches. The Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator (HC/RC) has underlined how intertwined emergency response and development needs are and how difficult it is to attempt to separate the two.'⁷²

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Being responsible for the 'quick fix' and accountability requirements of donors and aid agencies could be an obstacle to good linkages between relief and development. According to those interviewed in a recent study on LRRD, there are few incentives to think about problems that are outside one's own responsibility. The aid worker or desk officer of a humanitarian institution or department will always invest more time and energy in aspects related to her or his core responsibility. In the end this aspect is also related to power and to access to funding. It is about protecting budgets, jobs and organisations with their specific mandates.⁷³

⁷⁰ Anderson, M., et al. (2012), page 2.

⁷¹ 'As a Commissioner, it is much easier for me to raise money to respond to a disaster, especially the mega-disasters rather than the silent one. Yet, to raise attention and funding for resilience is much harder, because it is 'the dog that does not bark'.' Kristalina Georgieva, Reference: SPEECH/13/220, 11/03/2013.

⁷² Hidalgo, S. (2012), page 33.

⁷³ More than 75% of the respondents of a recent study about LRRD answered either 'fully agree' or 'somewhat agree' to the statement: 'There are conflicts of interests among ECHO, EEAS and DEVCO in respect of LRRD activities'. Morazan, P. et al. (2012), page 46.

3.4 Other important challenges

- **The disconnect challenge:** As described above, there is no shortage of commitments to LRRD. At policy level the need to properly link relief, rehabilitation and development has been acknowledged for decades. The application at the field level has been identified as the problem.⁷⁴ Humanitarian aid initiatives are implemented in isolation, without being connected to development processes.⁷⁵ Humanitarian and development actors analyse, plan and implement separately.⁷⁶ Parallel structures at country level exist for coordination and also within aid agencies.⁷⁷ Needs analyses and responses do not appropriately take the local context into account.⁷⁸
- **The exit challenge:** LRRD is often reduced to the need to properly transition from a humanitarian programme to rehabilitation and subsequently to development. This is why often the solution is sought in clear exit strategies. Humanitarian programmes should include strategies for some kind of handover, usually to local capacities.⁷⁹ In some instances, LRRD and ‘exit strategies’ are seen as synonyms, while the latter should be seen as only one element of LRRD.⁸⁰

Box 11 *Example from transition programming in Aceh & Nias*

Oxfam Great Britain concluded in a report that extensive exit strategies were in place. On the one hand this was positive for the handover process and for accountability to communities. This could however not compensate for a lack of a developmental strategy, which ultimately can lead to a ‘strategy vacuum undermining transition (...)’.⁸¹

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Even if exit strategies exist, their implementation is rarely followed up. Whether they have worked well or not can only be verified after the humanitarian programme has ended.⁸² At that point the accounts have been drawn up, the humanitarian agency has moved on and the donor focus has shifted to another crisis.

⁷⁴ See for example: DFID (2012), page 19; Hidalgo, S. (2012); Brusset, E. et al. (2009); Guha-Sapir, D., et al. (2011); DEC (2012).

⁷⁵ Hidalgo, S. (2012), pages 35 and 36.

⁷⁶ Hidalgo, S. (2012), page 36.

⁷⁷ ALNAP (2011), page 10; Hidalgo, S. (2012), page 36; Patrick, J. (2011), page 9.

⁷⁸ ALNAP (2011), page 10; Patrick, J. (2011), page 3.

⁷⁹ Some donors such as DG ECHO and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs for example require exit strategies in all funding proposals.

⁸⁰ Barham, J., et al. (2011), page 2: ‘For many of DG ECHO’s partners in Northern Uganda, LRRD is synonymous with DG ECHO’s exit strategy’.

⁸¹ Sandison, P., et al. (2008), pages 4 and 20.

⁸² Martínez-Piqueras, A. and Bascarán, M. (2012), pages 4 and 48.

Exit strategies also do not provide the solution in cases of recurring disasters. Haiti for example regularly faces crises brought about by hurricanes. In 2010 the earthquake occurred, followed first by a tornado in August and then by a hurricane in October as well as by a cholera epidemic in that same year. Humanitarian assistance was prolonged.⁸³ The promotion of exit strategies at project level is commonly accepted. The reduction of humanitarian aid to its core mandate of saving lives in general – as already proposed by the EC in 2001 – is however not promoted across the board.

- **The timing challenge:** Related to the exit strategies is the aspect of timing. Who decides when and how relief should scale down and give way to rehabilitation? When should newly created or reinforced humanitarian structures such as the cluster coordination best be scaled down? Who delivers the context analysis that provides the data for these decisions? Given the multitude of actors and the absence of common analysis and decision-making frameworks there is often no coherence in this regard.

The delivery of aid in fragile contexts is very challenging. Working with partners and working with continuity are difficult. The need to react timely often results in a prolonged humanitarian response beyond its original life-saving mandate.⁸⁴ Humanitarian aid is then criticised for working in the ‘crisis mode’ for too long by acting as a substitute for local capacities without properly supporting these structures. Humanitarian agencies in turn defend themselves by pointing out that there are no rehabilitation or development interventions in place to take over. Because of the fragility of such contexts, development actors shy away from the risks of an intervention or do not believe the contexts are yet ready for longer-term interventions.

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Box 12 *Beyond emergency in Darfur*

The conflict in Darfur peaked in 2003. International assistance scaled up significantly in 2004. Already in 2005, a UN commissioned study called for a ‘more holistic view of the complex overlay of needs and vulnerabilities in the Darfurs such as chronic underdevelopment, drought and desertification, and the on-going conflict and determine what can and should be done beyond the care and maintenance of IDPs’. Still most actors continued with short-term emergency aid only. In 2010, another UN report repeated similar messages and the Sudanese government issued a new strategy stressing long-term solutions. In 2011, the UN switched to a dual approach including emergency aid as well as more sustainable activities.⁸⁵

⁸³ Hidalgo, S. (2012), page 35 ; IOB (2011), page 20 ; Grünewald, F., et al. (2011), page 34.

⁸⁴ EC (2011), page 45; Weingärtner, L., et al. (2012), page 32.

⁸⁵ UN and Partners Work Plan 2011 (<https://docs.unocha.org/>); Otto, R. and Strele, M. (2011), page 35.

3.5 Conclusions

The challenges to good linkages between relief and development are numerous. Most have been known for a long time (e.g. ‘the two worlds apart’, the timing and the exit challenges). They are thus included in concepts and approaches that address the LRRD challenges. Some challenges and the effectiveness of proposed solutions, however, are hardly ever discussed in the LRRD debate (e.g. the ‘quick fix challenge’ and the link to accountability of the different actors).



4

LRRD concepts, capacities and mechanisms

Today, there is generally no lack of commitment to LRRD on the part of humanitarian actors.⁸⁶ The Netherlands' Humanitarian Policy, published in 2011, for example, focuses on strengthening local capacity, transition, exit strategies, DRR and reconstruction.⁸⁷ NGOs such as Cordaid, the Netherlands' Red Cross, Oxfam/Novib and Care Netherlands all commit in one way or another explicitly to a humanitarian assistance approach that goes beyond life-saving activities.⁸⁸ NGOs often do not use the term LRRD. Instead, they focus on DRR and, more recently, also on resilience, which – according to interviews conducted for this study – are seen as the appropriate approaches for linking humanitarian aid, rehabilitation and development cooperation.

Donors and other actors have developed a number of concepts in order to fulfil these policy commitments. This chapter will discuss these concepts, which include DRR, early recovery and resilience. The chapter will also look at (funding) instruments in place for LRRD as well as at existing guidelines and tools.

4.1 LRRD concepts

There have never been concepts or approach papers formulated with the title 'LRRD concept'. In 1996 and in 2001, the EC documented the discussion of the topic in two communications. These communications have shaped the term LRRD. Today, however, there is little reference to these communications any more. Momentarily, there are various other concepts that address the challenge to link relief to development. These are primarily DRR and resilience. Early recovery also has to be mentioned. These concepts both stress the importance of taking the longer-term view into account in humanitarian aid and of focusing on national and local capacities.⁸⁹

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While all these concepts certainly have their merits, none of them address all challenges related to good LRRD.⁹⁰ Within the humanitarian sector the uptake of DRR has resulted in an increased investment in preparedness.⁹¹ Despite originally being a concept for development aid, DRR could not bring the 'two worlds apart' together and has therefore remained an approach associated with humanitarian aid until now.

Early recovery has been another important initiative to promote development-approaches in humanitarian aid. The concept has led to an increased focus on recovery in certain contexts. In general, however, and according to a number of studies, early recovery is largely

⁸⁶ For donor policies and instruments see annex 6. In a recent survey on LRRD, about 90% of the respondents answered with either 'fully agree' or 'somewhat agree' to the question: 'LRRD should be a binding approach for all funding instruments and implementing agencies'. Morazan, P. et al. (2012), page 45.

⁸⁷ BZ (2011); see above chapter 3.1 for the GHD Principles.

⁸⁸ www.cordaid.org; www.rodekruijs.nl; www.carenederland.org; www.oxfamnovib.nl.

⁸⁹ For further details see annex 5.

⁹⁰ See annex 4 for details.

⁹¹ ALNAP (2012), pages 45 and 58.

seen as a UN concept and is thus closely associated with the cluster approach.⁹² It is doubtful whether early recovery has the potential to bring the ‘two worlds’ closer together. The concept introduces development-oriented elements into humanitarian aid, which is positive. The concept, however, is clearly only rooted in the humanitarian sector.

The current centre of attention has clearly shifted to resilience.⁹³ Some interlocutors consulted for this study see the highest potential for good LRRD in the current focus on resilience. Some see resilience as the optimum entry point for reviving the discussions about linking the different policy fields. Others see resilience as too broad to serve as a framework that actually brings the policy fields of humanitarian, rehabilitation and development aid closer together. Resilience could just be an ‘empty shell’, a ‘labelling exercise’ or another buzzword that is introduced into project proposals and reporting without really changing the actual way of working.⁹⁴ A number of buzzwords have been used over the years:

Box 13 *Lost in labelling?*

| Non-exclusive list of concepts, approaches and terms with relevance for LRRD: | |
|---|--|
| Developmental relief | Transition |
| Invulnerable development | Recovery |
| Disaster risk reduction | Early recovery |
| Disaster prevention | Climate-smart disaster risk management |
| Disaster resilience | Climate change adaptation |
| Livelihood resilience | Human security |
| Resilience | Social protection |
| Resilience management | |

Some critics have argued that there is not yet enough knowledge about the application of the resilience approach at country level.⁹⁵ While a number of initiatives have been implemented under the resilience headline, it is too early to see to what extent the concept resilience influences the entire sector globally.⁹⁶ Resilience, at present, has mainly been put into practice in drought related contexts.⁹⁷

⁹² Steets, J., et al. (2010), pages 15 and 57 ; Grünewald, F. (2010), page 31.

⁹³ The EC, for example, in 2012 published a communication on resilience. It refers to DRR and climate change adaptation and to LRRD when it comes to learning from experience. EC (2012), page 7.

⁹⁴ Grünewald, F. and Warner, J. (2012), page 4; see also IDS (2012), page 13, ALNAP (2012), page 58.

⁹⁵ Interviews undertaken for this study; see also HPG (2012).

⁹⁶ DFID has undertaken country case studies in DRC, Ethiopia, Nepal and Kenya. The EC has launched Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience and *Alliance Globale pour l'Initiative Résilience au Sahel*.

⁹⁷ The most prominent initiatives are: Joint Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Ministerial and High Level Development Partners Meeting on drought resilience in Nairobi; *Global Alliance for Resilience in the Sahel*.

Resilience is a conceptual framework. It embraces already existing concepts, such as DRR, early warning and others.⁹⁸ Resilience could indeed become the joint framework for humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. The framework could be used for joint context analyses; joint needs assessments, joint planning and integrated programming. Having resilience as the common overarching goal would provide humanitarian programming with important guidance.⁹⁹ Humanitarian programmes would need to take long-term perspectives into account and should not, at the very least, undermine development processes.

While the concept of resilience theoretically has potential, it still needs to be put into practice by lots of actors. This would demonstrate to what extent the concept addresses important challenges related to LRRD. The concept as such does not offer any solution to the challenge of working with humanitarian principles (this implies the challenge of working with state actors – see chapter 5.6). Finally it does not openly address the tendency of some actors to try to ‘fix’ certain problems quickly and then move on to other contexts.

4.2 Instruments and budget lines

LRRD specific instruments or budget lines are rare. Among informants within this study there was largely a consensus that LRRD specific instruments or budget lines would in fact be counter-productive to good linkages.

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Box 14 *Germany's shift in transitional aid*

For many years, the German Government had a specific budget line for development-oriented emergency and transitional aid to support LRRD, which was managed by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). With a recent re-organisation, the humanitarian department at the Federal Foreign Office now has the full responsibility for managing humanitarian aid and has extended its mandate to humanitarian transitional aid. A new instrument for development-oriented transitional aid managed by BMZ has replaced the previous budget line, but with a significantly reduced budget.

Sometimes programmes are called ‘LRRD programmes’ when they are explicitly created to link relief, rehabilitation and development. In cases where there is a UN managed cluster called ‘early recovery’, there are sometimes ‘early recovery programmes’ grouped under this heading.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ See USAID (2012), page 10.

⁹⁹ The same was expected from the rights-based approach about 15 years ago. See UNDP (2006).

¹⁰⁰ See for example Consolidated Appeals for Djibouti or Haiti (2012): <http://fts.unocha.org>.

Instead of having a specific budget line or instrument, there are efforts to link and adapt the instruments for humanitarian aid, for development and for stability in order to better respond to the LRRD challenges.¹⁰¹ Specific budget lines for reconstruction and for stabilisation in conflict contexts are in place (e.g. at the EC, in the Netherlands and Germany).¹⁰² When adapting and using these budget lines there is usually a focus on increasing flexibility in funding and programming as well as on longer-term funding in order to allow for more long-term programming.¹⁰³ The aim is to create a broad ‘toolbox’ that is applicable to all contexts.

Box 15 *Linkages and flexibility for LRRD in EC instruments*¹⁰⁴

- The EC’s Humanitarian Aid instrument refers to long-term development objectives.
- New flexible regulations have recently been proposed for the EC’s Development Cooperation Instrument.
- The Food Security Thematic Programme includes regulations for ‘exceptional situations of transitional and state fragility’.
- There is an Instrument for Stability that has a potential linkage function, which has been rarely used related to humanitarian aid in the past. Today, there is an example where the instrument has been used related to humanitarian aid (see below on SHARE).
- The European Development Fund includes a specific ‘envelope’ (B-envelope) that allows for a flexible allocation of funds under specific circumstances such as crises.¹⁰⁴

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Flexibility in the use of different funding instruments, however, continues to present a challenge.¹⁰⁵ In Haiti, for example, EU humanitarian funding turned out to be in too short supply to properly link up humanitarian initiatives with the EU’s development instrument. The development instrument (in this case the EDF) was not adapted to the earthquake situation.¹⁰⁶

The case of Germany has shown that despite the existence of a funding instrument for transition, LRRD often depends on the capacities of the implementing partners who work in more than one policy field. The reasons for difficulties in linking humanitarian assistance to development cooperation are the lack of a common framework, the lack of a shared

¹⁰¹ For further details regarding donor structures and instruments supporting LRRD see annex 6.

¹⁰² At the EC: The Instrument for Stability; in Germany: Development-oriented stabilisation and transitional aid; in the Netherlands: Stability Fund with a limited budget of 3-5 million Euro per country; for more on Stability Funds see annex 10.

¹⁰³ Evaluations on LRRD carried out at the end of 2005, remarked how the gap between relief and rehabilitation was avoided due largely to access to unearmarked funds raised by the general public, and to donor flexibility.

¹⁰⁴ For details see annex 12 and Striffler, M. & Berman, Th. (2012).

¹⁰⁵ Hidalgo, S. (2012), page 36; Grünewald, F., et al. (2011), pages 60 and 63; Morazan, P. et al. (2012), page 45.

¹⁰⁶ Grünewald, F., et al. (2011), page 63.

context analysis and limitations in cases where the target country was not a partner country for German development cooperation.¹⁰⁷

Flexibility within already allocated funds or mechanisms integrated into instruments or programmes seem to work better. An example of this is the so called ‘crisis modifier’ of USAID, which was developed in the 1990s. This mechanism acknowledges changing livelihood dynamics during a drought cycle and permits the injection of resources from the US Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance and the reallocation of existing funds.¹⁰⁸ Another example given is the B-envelope of the EC instrument for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and the overseas countries and territories, the EDF.¹⁰⁹

Box 16 *EU initiatives to strengthen LRRD in the field of food and nutrition security*

The EU addresses LRRD very prominently in the field of food and nutrition security.¹¹⁰ The current Food Security Thematic Programme provides the framework for LRRD especially when addressing food security for the poor and vulnerable in fragile situations.¹¹¹ LRRD also features in the context for DG ECHO’s External Consultation on Undernutrition in Emergencies and the positioning of the EC when addressing maternal and child undernutrition.¹¹² A Joint Framework (‘One EU’) for tackling malnutrition in the Sahel has recently been elaborated as a tool for use in LRRD.¹¹³

A recent evaluation, however, confirms the ‘disconnect challenge’ described in this study: ‘ECHO faces serious challenges in operationalising its commitments to LRRD in the area of food security. These are mainly structural and often outside ECHO’s direct control. At field level, positive examples of LRRD included ECHO’s response to chronic food insecurity and acute malnutrition in the Sahel, and disaster risk reduction in the Horn of Africa.’¹¹⁴ And the Sahel Working Group highlights: ‘The LRRD approach of the EC is a positive step, but is still has very far to go to effectively integrate humanitarian and development assistance.’¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁷ Weingärtner, L., et al. (2012), page 46.

¹⁰⁸ The crisis modifier was activated in the recent Horn of Africa crisis. The results regarding its capacity and implementation flexibility were mixed (for details see Sida, L. et al. (2012), page 23). Including crisis modifiers into development programmes was also suggested at a GHD meeting in 2012.

¹⁰⁹ See box 15 and annex 12.

¹¹⁰ The European Commission’s Policies and Practices. Linking Relief with Rehabilitation and Development for Food Security (Powerpoint-presentation); Harvey, P. et al. (2010).

¹¹¹ Specific funding has been allocated in the context of the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011-2013 for eight countries (Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, North-Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea). European Commission (2010).

¹¹² EC, DG ECHO: External Consultation Paper on Undernutrition in Emergencies. EuropeAid (2009).

¹¹³ The Joint Framework ‘One EU’. Malnutrition in the Sahel (Powerpoint-presentation).

¹¹⁴ Haver, K. et al. (2012), page vi.

¹¹⁵ Gubbels, P. (2011), page 57.

A number of pilot approaches could be identified in which donors came together to combine or group funding for programming that took the longer-term vision into account. One example is the EU funded SHARE initiative in the Horn of Africa (see chapter 5.4 and annex 13 for details). The second example is the financial contribution of the Netherlands ministry of Foreign Affairs to an NGO programme in Haiti. The NGO fundraising association Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties – SHO had designed a proposal for immediate relief that already contained a rough outline (budget and possible activities) for the subsequent reconstruction phase. The government funding came from the humanitarian budget line and from the reconstruction budget line.¹¹⁶

It is positive that in some countries multi-annual framework contracts with NGOs are possible.¹¹⁷ Funding humanitarian assistance over a longer time frame supports better linkages of humanitarian aid to development cooperation. There are also efforts by some donors for more multi-annual funding to multilateral agencies (e.g. in the Netherlands, UK, Sweden).¹¹⁸ The idea is to give the implementing organisations more flexibility and a longer time frame that goes beyond an annual project cycle. Both are supposed to allow for better LRRD.

Common humanitarian funds managed at country level do not yet allow for multi-annual funding (see chapter 5.3).

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4.3 LRRD specific guidelines and tools

So far, no specific guidelines or tools for LRRD have been developed. During interviews a few interlocutors expressed interest in operational guidelines for LRRD. The EC is currently developing such guidelines but details are not yet publicly available. A tool for joint planning has been introduced (joint humanitarian-development framework – JHDF, see box 18 in chapter 5.1).

DFID and USAID have developed principles for resilience, which are also relevant to LRRD.¹¹⁹ The principles stress ownership and long-term approaches as well as integrated approaches and selected interventions based on criteria.¹²⁰ In the case of the US, the principles are

¹¹⁶ A similar set-up was applied in Southern Sudan.

¹¹⁷ Denmark, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, and the UK. Canada is testing multi-annual funding to NGOs based on a two-year allocation. Walton, O. (2011), page 5.

¹¹⁸ Sweden, UK, Denmark. Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Austria, New Zealand and Belgium support individual UN agencies such as OCHA with multi-annual funding. Walton, O. (2011), page 5. The Netherlands make multi-annual commitments to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). The same might be possible for Common Humanitarian Funds once there are multi-annual CAPs (see chapter 5.3).

¹¹⁹ The EC is currently working on an action plan for resilience in crisis prone countries (status April 2012).

¹²⁰ USAID (2012), pages 16 and 17; DFID (2011), page 15.

complemented by an agenda for operational change including:¹²¹

- Joint problem analysis and objective setting;
- Coordinated strategic planning;
- Mutually informed project designs and procurements;
- Learning.

OECD DAC guidelines for donors exist in relation to engagement in fragile states and for financing transition.¹²² These guidelines originate from the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and have recently been reconfirmed in the 'New Deal', which further specifies cooperation arrangements and commitments in transitional contexts.¹²³

These guidelines have high potential for positively influencing LRRD as they address an extensive number of the challenges related to LRRD (see the overview in annex 4). The guidelines call for a focus on non-linear solutions at country level, and promote prevention and context-specific long-term engagement. They stress the importance of coordination and a clear allocation of responsibilities. There is a high level of commitment to these guidelines by donors. The OECD DAC guidelines, however, mainly address peacebuilding actors and make little to no reference to humanitarian assistance. The focus on state-building potentially conflicts with 'the principles challenge'.

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Performance assessments often include an assessment of LRRD. Recent real-time evaluations, for example, have included LRRD. The evaluation criterion 'connectedness' has been established.¹²⁴ These tools are thus available for raising awareness for LRRD, for learning and follow-up.

4.4 Conclusions

Concepts with relevance for LRRD are in place (DRR, Early Recovery, Resilience). There are also guidelines that are not explicitly drafted for LRRD but that can be used in order to fund humanitarian assistance in a way that favours good LRRD. To what extent the new resilience debate adds value to the approach to LRRD still needs to be established once more concrete and sector-wide results are available. The focus of these concepts and guidelines lies in long-term solutions and coordination. In terms of funding, flexibility to apply different instruments or to follow a programmatic approach seems to work. Flexible funding that is already built into instruments or programmes can be disbursed in case of a crisis. Unfortunately, the combined use of different funding instruments in order to respond flexibly to a crisis remains an exception.

¹²¹ USAID (2012), page 18.

¹²² OECD DAC (2007): Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. Paris; OECD DAC (2011a): Supporting Statebuilding in Situation of Conflict and Fragility. DAC Guidelines and Reference Series. Paris.

¹²³ High Level Forum (2005) and High Level Forum (2011).

¹²⁴ Connectedness refers to the need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account.



5

Approaches favouring LRRD

This chapter will discuss a number of approaches used in humanitarian assistance that are expected to favour good LRRD. The importance of looking at processes insofar as to how aid is provided has been highlighted in a recent global study on international assistance. The study revealed that recipients of aid value international aid, but say that these benefits are often compromised by how the aid is provided.¹²⁵

5.1 Coordination and restructuring

Improving coordination in order to overcome the above-described challenge of the ‘two worlds apart’ has been central in the LRRD debate for a long time.¹²⁶ In recent years, thanks to increased efforts and reform processes, the humanitarian coordination frameworks have become stronger. Today, coordination at the field level in larger humanitarian aid contexts tends to be quite comprehensive. There are, for example, sector focused clusters and web-based information sharing platforms. Humanitarian coordination also includes aspects that go beyond short-term support to survival.¹²⁷ There are, however, usually no coordination frameworks integrating the different actors and policy fields and, as a result, parallel structures exist.¹²⁸

Box 17 DFID Country Case Study DRC

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‘Humanitarian and development responses in DRC are currently very poorly coordinated. There are separate coordination mechanisms for each sector, with currently no regular cross-representation. Information sharing and joint planning mechanisms are virtually non-existent. DFID is one of the only donors who manage their humanitarian portfolio as a part of their development programme.’¹²⁹

The early recovery clusters in the various contexts, as part of the humanitarian coordination efforts, can have an important function in promoting key issues not covered in other clusters. At the same time they can also have the opposite effect. Rather than facilitating integration, they can block discussions on LRRD by creating a separate coordination structure.¹³⁰

At headquarters’ level examples of coordination efforts for better linkages can be identified. At the EC the *Interservice Group on Transition* involving DG Development Cooperation – EuropeAid and DG ECHO has recently been revived. The group was founded in 2003 but was not very successful. A recent survey among implementing agencies showed, however, that

¹²⁵ Anderson, M. et al. (2012), page 21.

¹²⁶ See for example the recommendations in the EC Communication on LRRD (2001), page 7.

¹²⁷ Steets, J., et al. (2010); see for specific examples of coordination at the field level: Spaak, M. and Otto, R. (2009), page 10.

¹²⁸ See for example the case of Haiti in Hidalgo, S. (2012), page 36: ‘There is limited interaction between development donors (the G 12) and the Humanitarian Country Team for planning purposes or around specific issues’.

¹²⁹ <http://www.dfid.gov.uk>.

¹³⁰ Steets, J., et al. (2010), pages 15, 37, 57.

the large majority of respondents do not believe in the (fruitful) existence of effective coordinating mechanisms concerning LRRD between DG ECHO, DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid and the European External Action Service.¹³¹

USAID established a Joint Planning Cell for the Sahel in 2012. USAID has also set up a multidisciplinary team from across USAID to develop a strategy for building resilience in the region.¹³² At the Swedish agency Sida operate joint humanitarian and development teams for some fragile states (Afghanistan, DRC, Sudan, occupied Palestinian Territories and Iraq). In the UK the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) established a ‘Fragile States Team’ in 2012.

Box 18 *The EC’s joint humanitarian-development framework*

Based on an initiative from 2005 the EC has recently developed a tool to support joint humanitarian and development planning: The joint humanitarian-development framework (JHDF). The objective is to bring together humanitarian and development actors in the analysis phase. The application is flexible. It can be applied as a comprehensive exercise at country level or as a half-day workshop at headquarters. Proposed steps for the analysis process are:

Step 1: Discussion on the overall nature of the crisis

Step 2: Identification of the target population

Step 3: Joint analysis of the causes for the food insecurity of the target population

Step 4: Identification of EU responses

Step 5: Assessment of the coherence of EU interventions, definition of strategic priorities and design of an action plan

So far it has not been integrated into EC guidelines for project cycle management or similar. It was applied in the Horn of Africa to guide the analytical work of the Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience (SHARE) initiative.

There have been a number of recent organisational changes in donor countries as a result of the increased focus on fragility related to conflicts. In the Netherlands there has been, since 2012, a single department for humanitarian assistance, stability and reconstruction that is expected to facilitate coordination between the different policy fields.¹³³ Additionally, according to interviews, there are efforts to coordinate regional programming to a greater degree and to intensify the inter-departmental dialogue.

¹³¹ About 80% of the respondents answered with either ‘somewhat disagree’ or ‘fully disagree’ to the statement: ‘ECHO, EEAS and DEVCO have effective coordinating mechanisms concerning LRRD’. Morazan, P. et al. (2012), page 45.

¹³² USAID (2012), page 15.

¹³³ According to interviews it is not the first time that humanitarian assistance and reconstruction are combined in one division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

At the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, humanitarian assistance is part of the department for multilateral development. At Sida humanitarian aid is integrated into one department called 'conflict and post-conflict cooperation'. At the EC's DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid a unit for 'Fragility and Crisis Management' has been put in place.¹³⁴ Among other things, the unit's mandate is to 'act as a focal point and network with internal and external stakeholders concerned by the situation of fragility or crisis (...), including Transition (LRRD)'.¹³⁵ In Germany the responsibility for humanitarian aid has just been centralised within the Federal Foreign Office leading to the reduced role of the Ministry for Development Cooperation in humanitarian aid.

In most cases, these new structures do not have their origins in LRRD-specific considerations. The increased attention on a 'whole of government' approach leads to an integration of humanitarian aid and other policy fields such as peacebuilding and state building. Such movement bears the risk of undermining humanitarian principles.

5.2 Country (risk) assessments

Context and needs assessment processes have high potential in terms of providing the contextual information in order to create good linkages between the different policy fields. First, context analyses and needs assessments for humanitarian programming should take long-term perspectives into account. Second, these processes could be used to overcome the 'two worlds apart' by bringing actors from the different policy fields together.

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The humanitarian sector has seen moderate improvements in needs assessments over the past years.¹³⁶ There are efforts to increase collaboration on situation reports and joint needs assessments. Some sector specific assessment tools are in place and CAPs are increasingly based on joint or coordinated needs assessments.¹³⁷ At the same time the humanitarian sector is weak at analysing contexts appropriately and comprehensively. The involvement of national actors, the inclusion of local voices, the assessment of local capacities and potentials, and the adaptation to changing needs still need improvement.¹³⁸ These issues are closely linked to challenges identified around leadership in the humanitarian aid sector.¹³⁹

¹³⁴ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm.

¹³⁵ Directorate General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid Main missions of DEVCO Directorates & Units, Final 03/08/2011.

¹³⁶ ALNAP (2012), page 50.

¹³⁷ OCHA (2009), page 5.

¹³⁸ ALNAP (2012), page 51; Grünewald, F., et al. (2011), page 29 and 42.

¹³⁹ Buchanan-Smith, M. (2011).

New initiatives aiming at the improvement of needs assessments in the humanitarian sector promote the recovery orientation.¹⁴⁰ The focus of new initiatives however appears to be mainly on early rapid needs assessments and on early recovery. The initiatives strive to bring humanitarian actors together under one umbrella with common approaches. They do not yet include linkages to actors and mechanisms from other policy areas, which would increase the potential for overcoming the ‘two worlds apart’.¹⁴¹

Box 19 *Experience from the 2010 Haiti earthquake*

Evaluations show that the immediate needs were mainly met and sometimes even exceeded. Consequently attention could shift away from life-saving. In some cases there was a good awareness of the need for long-term engagement right from the start. Comprehensive needs assessments were undertaken after the relief phase was over. A Reconstruction Action Plan and Recovery Commission were put in place.

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The 2011 Horn of Africa crisis has shown that even where early warning systems are in place, there can still be little early action.¹⁴⁶ The lesson learnt has also been that the focus has to shift in order to respond appropriately to recurrent crises such as the food crisis at the Horn of Africa or in the Sahel region. There is a call for an increased focus on risks. Periodic context analysis, instead of one-off reactive after-shock assessments, is important. Including actors’ analyses and assessments of local and national capacities becomes relevant in this regard. Some NGOs already undertake global risk assessments annually or bi-annually in order to identify high-risk countries for special programming.¹⁴⁷ Donors have strategic partnerships with selected countries and exclude other countries from their development assistance. The same kind of selection and division of labour does not exist for countries affected by humanitarian disasters. Donors do however decide on an annual basis on which countries with protracted crisis to support.

¹⁴⁰ See annex 14 for details on the IASC Needs Assessment Task Force, the Assessment Capacities Project.

¹⁴¹ The UN Transformative Agenda is a recent initiative that aims to improve collective action, however primarily for humanitarian emergencies and not for the two policy fields humanitarian aid and development cooperation.

¹⁴² Guha-Sapir, D., et al. (2011), page 24.

¹⁴³ ACT (2011), pages 53 and 54 ; IOB (2011), page 22 ; Hidalgo, S., (2012), page 34 ; Guha-Sapir, D., et al. (2011), page 12.

¹⁴⁴ Rapid Initial Needs Assessment for Haiti, Post Disaster Needs Assessment, see Grünewald, F. and Binder, A. (2010), pages 29 and 42.

¹⁴⁵ <http://www.haitireconstructionfund.org>.

¹⁴⁶ Save the Children and Oxfam (2012), page 3; Venton, C., et al. (2012).

¹⁴⁷ See for example the Oxfam Classification of Humanitarian Crises Toolkit, <http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk>.

5.3 Decision-making and funding at country level

Moving from thematic policy fields and centrally managed instruments to joint country programming with collaborative decision-making at country level is potentially another way of overcoming the ‘two worlds apart’. Exchanges and collaboration between development and humanitarian aid actors – be they national or international – are less difficult at the country level. The geographic proximity and the possibility to meet in person is only one of the reasons for that. At the country level the most relevant stakeholders with particular interest in the specific country context can come together. Only at country level can an appropriate context analysis take place.¹⁴⁸

In a few cases a moderate shift to decision-making at country level is taking place:

- The UNOCHA-managed Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) is a locally managed fundraising and coordination mechanism with importance for the humanitarian aid sector. As a mechanism for humanitarian aid it is adapted to short-term humanitarian programming. The CAP is prepared annually with mid-term revisions. In some countries annual CAPs are prepared for many consecutive years. The short-term planning cycle can hamper good LRRD (see chapter 5.4). Today, the international community is discussing the possibility of preparing multi-annual CAPs. In Kenya the latest annual CAPs were accompanied by a three-year humanitarian strategy covering 2011-2013.¹⁴⁹ The most recent CAP for Somalia covers the years 2013 to 2015.
- Common humanitarian funds are managed at country level (e.g. in DRC, Central African Republic, in Sudan and in South Sudan). These funds encourage the key humanitarian players to work together more closely and more coherently through advisory boards and through information sharing.¹⁵⁰ The funds can potentially also lead to better linkages and alignment with rehabilitation and development processes in place at country level.¹⁵¹ Currently they are, however, mainly used for humanitarian funding only and do not allow for multi-annual funding.¹⁵² A recent evaluation highlights the need for more linkages between these funds and multi-donor trust funds in place for recovery and stabilisation.¹⁵³

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¹⁴⁸ Taking the context as the starting point is the first principle of the OECD DAC Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations: ‘It is essential for international actors to understand the specific context in each country, and develop a shared view of the strategic response that is required.’

¹⁴⁹ https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/4.2_Kenya_Strategic-Objectives.pdf.

¹⁵⁰ Goyder, H. (2011), page 18.

¹⁵¹ Even if not at country level, there is coordination at donor level within the Netherlands of the common funds for Sudan: The responsibility for the Common Humanitarian Fund as well as for the Multi-Donor-Trust-Fund for Sudan lies within the same person.

¹⁵² This is due to the fact that multi-annual Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF) require multi-annual CAPs. The latter are slowly being established now, which means that multi-annual CHFs are starting to become an option.

¹⁵³ Goyder, H. (2011), pages 5 and 12.

- Seven large reconstruction funds have been set up to date, four of which seek to support post-conflict recovery: Afghanistan, South Sudan, the occupied Palestinian Territories and Iraq. Two have been set up to assist in the aftermath of natural disasters: Haiti and Indonesia. Current levels of multi-year funding however are not sufficient to allow comprehensive and long-term support for building the fund's institutional capacity.¹⁵⁴ The case of Sudan shows that the number and the timing of establishing reconstruction funds actually can add to the complexity and fragmentation of the funding system.¹⁵⁵
- Donor agencies still decide about funding mainly at headquarters' level and there is little humanitarian staff capacity at the field level.¹⁵⁶ In the UK, the responsibility for a country programme lies with the country office. There are advisors at country level for humanitarian programming, resilience or climate change.¹⁵⁷
- The UN Resident Coordinator System and the UN country teams are locally based structures. UNICEF and UNHCR also have a locally managed selection and negotiation processes for contracts with NGO partners.
- A number of NGOs have undergone or are currently undergoing decentralisation processes. Decision-making responsibilities are gradually shifting to regional and country offices.

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These examples show that there is the potential for linking up with decision-making structures at the country level. What seems to be missing is the framework and specific instruments for closer linkages between humanitarian action and development initiation at the country level.

5.4 Long-term engagement and combined funding at country level

A recent global study among recipients of international assistance revealed that even in emergencies interlocutors preferred an international engagement to address the long-term challenges that caused a crisis rather than the short-term assistance.¹⁵⁸ The conclusion from the recent IASC study of the Ethiopia drought response confirms this view: 'The strategy of having long-term predictable systems in place addressing chronic and acute vulnerability reduces suffering and saves lives.'¹⁵⁹ Over the past years Ethiopia saw long-term engagement of the government and international aid agencies in humanitarian emergencies.

¹⁵⁴ UKAID 2011.

¹⁵⁵ See annex 11 Fragmentation of funding instruments and programmes in Southern Sudan.

¹⁵⁶ Spaak, M. and Otto, R. (2009).

¹⁵⁷ www.DFID.gov.uk.

¹⁵⁸ Anderson, M. et al. (2012), page 21.

¹⁵⁹ Sida, L. et al. (2012), page 12.

There are other recent examples for crisis-related engagements beyond the short-term humanitarian response. It still remains to be seen to what extent they enable good LRRD. In Haiti, for example, many aid agencies planned from an early stage in the disaster response for three to five year programmes. In 2010 the Netherlands committed to a five-year joint humanitarian and reconstruction programme (2010 to 2014), which was to be funded from two different budget lines.¹⁶⁰

Box 20 *LRRD within the Netherlands' funded Haiti earthquake response 2010*

An evaluation of the Netherlands' funded Haiti earthquake response found that the evaluated organisations had worked in development cooperation in Haiti prior to the earthquake. When the earthquake occurred these organisations could switch from a development mode to an emergency mode 'without major difficulties'.¹⁶¹

To what extent plans for rehabilitation and reconstruction were already implemented could not be assessed comprehensively in this evaluation. It covered only the first 10 months of the response. It found nevertheless that the implementation of rehabilitation and reconstruction was hampered 'due to the protracted nature of the emergency, which was caused by the cholera epidemic (...) and by the international community's inability to quickly start large-scale rehabilitation and reconstruction activities largely due to other contextual factors, including the Haitian government's lack of planning'.¹⁶²

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Further examples for longer-term engagement are:¹⁶³

- In 2012 the EC committed to funding an 18 month first phase for the initiative 'Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience (SHARE)'.¹⁶⁴
- The World Bank's multi-donor funded Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia runs from 2011 to 2016. The programme includes a contingency budget and also a Risk Financing Mechanism in case of shocks, which would lead to increased needs.¹⁶⁵

The 2012 State of the Humanitarian Systems (SOHS) report confirms the growing commitment to longer-term programming. There is an increase of funding for recovery efforts and for long-term programming in protracted crises.¹⁶⁶ According to the report, recent evaluations show that the funding is not adequate, as it does not allow the organisations to work flexibly over the entire programme period.

¹⁶⁰ Humanitarian Assistance, administered by the Ministry's Humanitarian Aid Division (DMH/HH) as well as Rehabilitation and Reconstruction managed by the Ministry's Peace Building and Stability Unit (EFV).

¹⁶¹ IOB (2011), page 81.

¹⁶² IOB (2011), page 20.

¹⁶³ For more examples see DFID (2011), page 12.


¹⁶⁴ <http://ec.europa.eu/echo>; see the annex 13 for further details

¹⁶⁵ www.worldbank.org.

¹⁶⁶ ALNAP (2012), page 45.


In order to finance longer-term programmes aid agencies need to secure funding from different sources. Instead of having the entire programme duration and the funding needed covered by one contract, the organisations need to combine funding of various durations and volumes.

Figure 2 *A Tetris game? - Desired programme funding vs. funding reality¹⁶⁷*



Multi-mandated agencies (with both a humanitarian and a development mandate) note the restrictions on the use of funding in rapid-onset crises. Short-term emergency response funding is still prioritised over long-term rehabilitation funding. Even in contexts such as Eastern DRC, where vulnerability of the population is chronic, humanitarian assistance funding does not generally address longer-term issues.¹⁶⁸ This is confirmed by funding data for 10 countries as reported by OECD DAC, which shows that emergency food aid and emergency relief account for the large majority of humanitarian financing. According to this data, disaster prevention and preparedness and ‘reconstruction relief’ receive far less funding, even if it might come from other budget lines in some instances.

Figure 3 *Humanitarian Aid by expenditure type to the leading recipients, 2006-2010¹⁶⁹*



¹⁶⁷ Source: Médecins du Monde, France.

¹⁶⁸ Brusset, E., et al. (2011), page 81 .

¹⁶⁹ Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data; <http://www.devinit.org>.

5.5 Regional programming

Regional programming has the potential for integrating different policy fields, multi-sector approaches and longer-term vision into programming. Compared to a short-term project-focussed humanitarian aid initiative, regional programming means larger budgets and extended programme durations. SHARE has been mentioned as one example for a recent regional initiative. Another example is the response to the 2012 Sahel food crisis in a partnership called AGIR-Sahel (*Alliance Globale pour l'Initiative Résilience au Sahel*). Both AGIR and SHARE are very recent initiatives and still need to show the results allowing for an assessment of their achievements in terms of LRRD. At present there is no evidence that regional programming improves linkages between relief and development.

Box 21 *Alliance Globale pour l'Initiative Résilience au Sahel*

In 2012 AGIR has been agreed among 30 countries, the European Commission, humanitarian agencies and UN agencies, and other organisations such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and regional organisations.¹⁷⁰ The aim of the partnership is to strengthen the resilience of the affected people with an investment of about €750 million over three years. The approach aims – among others – to build seasonal safety nets, to invest in healthcare and other social sectors and in the functioning of food markets. AGIR includes a roadmap for better coordination of humanitarian aid and development. At this stage it is too early to assess to what extent the initiative favoured good linkages between the two policy fields.

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5.6 National authorities and local capacities

A key lesson from the response to the South-East Asia tsunami was that linkages have been most successful when the government was able to set clear policies and establish a coordinating presence in the disaster-affected region.¹⁷¹ The need for better dialogue with government authorities at national, regional and international levels was identified.

The lessons learned from the South-East Asia tsunami have been reconfirmed recently in the analysis of the Horn of Africa drought crisis. In Ethiopia, the government has led coordination through the line ministries. The ministries have switched from development approaches to emergency response when it was needed.¹⁷² The international system has supported government coordination in this (and other) emergency.

¹⁷⁰ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/2012/sahel_conference_2012_fr.htm.

¹⁷¹ See annex 7.

¹⁷² DFID (2012), page 12.

The role of affected states in responding to national disasters has attracted increased attention.¹⁷³ Institutional growth in disaster management¹⁷⁴ has been observed within aid-recipient states over the past years. National and regional NGOs play an increasingly important role in humanitarian aid.¹⁷⁵ At the same time, international humanitarian actors are often still struggling to effectively engage with national actors. This applies to both state actors as well as to civil society organisations.¹⁷⁶

Box 22 Example from Haiti¹⁷⁷

'Working through, and capacity building with, Haitian government did improve, but came late and was too little to make any significant difference to the early integration of recovery to the humanitarian response.'

A recent mapping exercise has identified around 2,800 national or local NGOs that are connected to the international humanitarian aid system.¹⁷⁸ Some have significant capacities and play a role beyond their national context. There is a broad consensus that working with local partners increases integration and alignment with development processes. Concrete examples confirming these benefits can be identified.¹⁷⁹ However, there is only little progress in terms of the engagement of national NGOs in international humanitarian aid.¹⁸⁰ The potential for good linkages between relief and development cooperation is not exploited enough.

5.7 Integrated approaches

Another important lesson from the response to the South-East Asia tsunami was on multi-sector integrated approaches. The most successful interventions were those that addressed needs in a variety of sectors, and that were linked to longer-term development planning. It was found, however, that these strategies have been difficult to formulate, due to policy fragmentation and excessively isolated initiatives. Additionally, humanitarian assistance organisations often have a sectoral specialisation, which reduces their ability to

¹⁷³ Harvey, P. (2009), page 1.

¹⁷⁴ According to the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Disaster Management can be defined as 'the organization and management of resources and responsibilities for dealing with all humanitarian aspects of emergencies, in particular preparedness, response and recovery in order to lessen the impact of disasters'. www.ifrc.org.

¹⁷⁵ In particular in Asia, see ALNAP (2012), page 31.

¹⁷⁶ ALNAP (2012), page 27; see for examples DFID (2012), page 22 and Grünewald, F., et al. (2011), page 56.

¹⁷⁷ Patrick, J. (2011), page 5.

¹⁷⁸ ALNAP (2012), page 31. They fulfil one or more of the following options: partnership agreement with, and/or receiving funds from a government donor, from a UN humanitarian agency, or an international NGO, registered with a major consortium or registry of international aid organisations.

¹⁷⁹ DEC (2012), page 17: 'Humanitarian responses implemented by national partners were reported to be closely linked and integrated with development projects in environmental management, food security, and gender equality'.

¹⁸⁰ ALNAP (2012), page 70.

take responsibility for appropriate and integrated actions to support crisis-affected populations in an area.¹⁸¹

Evaluations mention increased efforts in integrated approaches.¹⁸² Programmes combining more than one or two sectors and approaches exist, for example, in the long-term response to the Horn of Africa crisis.¹⁸³ It is, however, difficult to determine to what extent multi-sector integrated programmes actually exist and to what extent they have in the end supported good linkages between relief and development.

Regarding integrated approaches it is positive that DG ECHO's Global Plan allows for multi-sector planning.¹⁸⁴ Integrating one sector activity with others seems to be possible as was the case for most WASH activities funded by DG ECHO in the earthquake response in Haiti.¹⁸⁵ Appropriate integration into longer-term programming however appears to still be hampered by short-term funding periods (up to 15 months in this case).¹⁸⁶

Box 23 *Integrated neighbourhood approach in Haiti*

In Haiti, some agencies have piloted the so-called neighbourhood approach. The aim is to support longer-term resettlement including service delivery in shelter, livelihoods support, water and sanitation, community health and risk reduction. The approach made coordination easier. A challenge in the project-focused humanitarian set-up was however the need to work in a process-oriented manner during consultations and participation. The agencies had to build up relationships with the communities. The meeting schedules and the duration of the engagement did not necessarily comply with the life-cycles of projects.¹⁸⁷

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While the investment in the cluster coordination has its positives aspects, it also can hamper multi-sectoral integrated approaches. In Haiti, actors who implemented integrated approaches consequently advocated for the earlier merging of clusters.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸¹ Brusset, E. et al. (2009), page 113.

¹⁸² The idea of multi-sector integrated programming is also central to the resilience approach.

¹⁸³ They integrate food assistance, livelihoods support at household level, private sector support as well as cash or food for work for infrastructure projects, DFID resilience case studies Ethiopia and Kenya.

¹⁸⁴ Global Plans are DG ECHO's framework for humanitarian activities in a given country or region where the scale and complexity of the humanitarian crisis is such that it seems likely to continue.

¹⁸⁵ Grünewald, F., et al. (2011), page 31.

¹⁸⁶ Grünewald, F., et al. (2011), page 24.

¹⁸⁷ IFRC (2011), page 2 ; Hidalgo, S. (2012), page 26.

¹⁸⁸ Hidalgo, S. (2012), pages 80 and 82, in detail on cluster transition in Haiti, and for examples from other countries see pages 73 and following.

5.8 Conclusions

Coordination has been central to the LRRD debate. LRRD specific coordination efforts can be found more at headquarters' level than in the field. Needs and context analyses have been identified as enablers for linkages between the different policy fields. Improvements of the analysis and assessment processes are imminent. However, joint planning and decision-making for the different policy fields at country level are the exception.

A few developments that lead to more decision-making about humanitarian funding at country level are also on the way. There is, however, still a very long way to go until collaborative decision-making involving the key local stakeholders is achieved. There are commitments and efforts to increase longer-term engagements in crisis situations. A number of large-scale regional programmes have recently been initiated. Restrictions in the use of funds and short-term emergency response funding continue to dominate the humanitarian aid sector. This is particularly the case in sudden-onset disasters.

The fact that the role of local authorities is crucial in terms of LRRD has been reconfirmed in recent disasters and disaster responses.

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There is a commitment to integrated approaches. Beyond a few examples and pilot initiatives it is difficult to determine to what extent these are implemented and what the results are in terms of LRRD.



6

Assessment areas for humanitarian policy evaluation

In order to analyse LRRD more comprehensively, in upcoming evaluations of humanitarian policies or programmes, the following assessment areas are proposed:

- Policy commitment to LRRD, guidelines and procedures;
- Capacities supporting good linkages between relief and development;
- Approaches and processes favouring good linkages between relief and development.

Box 24 2006 Dutch humanitarian policy evaluation¹⁸⁹

The upcoming evaluation of the Dutch humanitarian policy will be a very good opportunity for the assessment of LRRD. LRRD was already addressed as one of many 'issues and challenges in humanitarian assistance' in the last Dutch humanitarian policy evaluation in 2006.¹⁹⁰

The country case studies undertaken for this evaluation focused on financial mechanisms by looking at their availability in order to fund the transition from relief to rehabilitation and to development. Having different budget lines for the different policy fields 'did not prove to be a constraint to linkage'.¹⁹¹ The study also highlighted the differences between countries that are partner countries for development cooperation (e.g. Afghanistan) and that are not (e.g. DRC and Burundi). While in Afghanistan the integrated approach was successful, there were gaps identified in funding between relief and the support for rehabilitation, reconstruction and development in Burundi and in DRC.¹⁹²

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6.1 Policy commitment to LRRD, guidelines and procedures

As shown above, the policy commitment is generally not the problem. The question therefore needs to be how the policy commitment is understood and how this commitment is translated into appropriate action.¹⁹³

The main questions are:

- To what extent do the actors commonly understand the need and the challenges to appropriately link relief, rehabilitation and development?
- Is there a common understanding of LRRD in the sense that humanitarian assistance should be provided in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development?

¹⁸⁹ IOB (2006).

¹⁹⁰ IOB (2006), page 38.

¹⁹¹ IOB (2006), page 286.

¹⁹² IOB (2006), page 287.

¹⁹³ As mentioned above, the Dutch humanitarian policy commits to 'transition'. Further elements of the policy are equally relevant for LRRD (e.g. the references to the need for exit strategies and reconstruction).

Is there enough awareness of the fact that humanitarian assistance can do harm to development processes? Is there action related to this awareness?

- Is this understanding clearly reflected in guidelines, practices and procedures?

Additional questions are:

- To what extent is there clarity and consistency in the use of terminology and concepts related to LRRD?
- What is the approach to exit strategies? Are exit strategies planned early on? Are they communicated to all relevant stakeholders? Are they realistic? Is there follow-up? Are there examples of ex-post evaluations of exit strategies?
- What are the policies and strategies in place in order to avoid humanitarian aid provided beyond the relief phase? What are the policies and strategies in place in order to enable quick initiation of rehabilitation programmes? To what extent are the policies and strategies implemented and do they lead to results?

6.2 Capacities supporting good linkages between relief and development

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Capacities of humanitarian actors need to be aligned with the policy commitment to LRRD. Funding mechanisms need to be designed for good linkages between relief and development. Thirdly, working with the implementing partners that can ensure good linkages is a supporting factor for good LRRD. The implementing partners need to have capacities for ensuring LRRD.

The main questions are therefore:

- To what extent do funding mechanisms support good linkages?
 - Are funding mechanisms in place in order to support good linkages according to the specific needs of the different humanitarian contexts?
 - Is there enough flexibility in the use of different funding mechanisms so that funding can be provided according to the specific LRRD needs?
 - Is there enough flexibility within each funding mechanism so that it can be adapted to the context-specific need?
 - To what extent is funding provided in a timely and predictable manner, supporting longer-term perspectives?
 - What is the ratio between short-term funding and funding for longer-term interventions?
- What are the implementing partners' capacities for ensuring good linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development?
 - To what extent are implementing partners working in all policy areas (relief, rehabilitation and development)? To what extent are they able to switch between relief, rehabilitation and development?
 - To what extent is the engagement of humanitarian partners solely focused on humanitarian work applying humanitarian principles?

- To what extent do policies, guidelines and practices exist for good LRRD among implementing partners?
- How is the 'principle challenge' addressed?
 - What concepts and capacities are in place for working with state actors in humanitarian assistance?
- What structures are in place to support good linkages?
 - Which fora exist to bring the 'two worlds apart' together (e.g. fora for dialogue, coordination, joint teams)?
 - What are concrete examples of good linkages that can be attributed to the existence of these fora?

6.3 Processes and approaches supporting good linkages between relief and development

Good linkages need to be integrated and taken into account when implementing processes, starting with needs assessments and ending with performance assessment.

- To what extent are guidelines, practices and procedures applied in projects and programmes at country level (reference to 6.1)?
- To what extent do needs assessments and context analyses take longer-term perspectives into account?
 - To what extent are needs assessments and context analysis processes done jointly with actors from all policy fields?
 - To what extent are local actors involved in needs assessments and context analyses?
 - Are there examples where local actors influenced the results of needs assessments?
 - To what extent are long-term plans set up right from the start of an intervention?
- To what extent does decision-making take place at country level?
 - Do examples exist where local actors influenced decision-making?
 - Are locally integrated mechanisms and instruments used and supported?
 - To what extent are local actors integrated and supported?
- To what extent are integrated multi-sector approaches implemented and to what results do they lead?
 - To what extent are partners working with integrated approaches?
 - To what extent do partners work with multi-sector approaches?
 - Which mechanisms and structures exist that favour or hamper integrated multi-sector approaches?
- Is LRRD part of the performance assessment at all stages of the project cycle (programme proposals, reporting, monitoring and evaluation)? Is the evaluation criterion 'connectedness' used in evaluations commissioned?



7

Conclusions

Nothing new?

The debate around LRRD is still high on the agenda of international cooperation. In the context of the recent humanitarian crises in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, high-level commitment for linking relief and development has been expressed, this time related to the debate around the concept of resilience. Concepts and capacities, however, mostly continue to follow the same trends as in past decades. In fact, the challenge to link relief to development has been discussed with few new developments since the late 1990s.

New trends in the humanitarian aid sector address some relevant aspects for the debate on linking relief to development. These trends have in common that they stress the need for long-term engagements, building on local ownership and capacities and better coordination. There is a renewed focus on joint analysis and planning, and on increased flexibility of funding mechanisms.

In the end, however, 'old solutions' are proposed for 'old problems'. More dialogue and increased coordination might not be sufficient for overcoming challenges and obstacles. The fact that some of the 'old problems', such as the compartmentalisation of aid and the strong focus on short-term material support, have 'survived' past reform efforts needs to be recognised and tackled more effectively.

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There is no shortage of policy commitments and concepts for linking relief to development. At the same time, there is little concrete knowledge about what works and what does not work best for those who are affected by a humanitarian crisis. Some challenges in linking relief to development are not addressed by existing policies and concepts.

More than 'gap-filling'!

Despite the long-lasting discussions, the need for good LRRD is not always sufficiently and appropriately understood. LRRD is more than 'gap-filling'. LRRD is more than 'handing over' a project from one budget line to the next. Each policy area needs to be adapted in order to better link to the other policy fields that are relevant in crisis contexts. The fact that humanitarian aid in itself has to be adapted in order to be 'supportive of recovery and long-term development' is not always recognised and clearly put into practice.

A number of approaches are expected to favour linkages between relief and development, especially long-term engagement, integrated approaches, joint country programming, and support to local ownership and the central role of the host government. These approaches have not yet been applied widely in humanitarian aid and there is little concrete knowledge about the specific results when it comes to the linkages to development.

Just do it!

Most of the concepts and the before-mentioned approaches are closely related to already ongoing reform processes in the humanitarian aid sector. They will need more time and wider application in order to develop their full potential. These efforts need to be strengthened. They need to be applied throughout the sector (e.g. beyond drought related humanitarian contexts) and beyond the immediate humanitarian crises. It is particularly important to apply these approaches at field level. While the need to link relief to development receives enough attention at policy level, in practice the link needs to be strengthened more systematically at field level in order to support crisis-affected people more effectively.

Bring them together!

One of the key challenges of linking relief and development is to overcome the 'two worlds apart'. The challenge is to improve collaboration, coordination and communication. Despite many efforts and resources invested in these areas, new and innovative forms of collaboration, coordination and communication that go beyond business as usual are still very rare. Additionally, there are neither frameworks nor initiatives that start or promote such new or innovative forms of collaboration.

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It is a challenge for humanitarian actors to remain committed to humanitarian principles and at the same time to take development and political dimension into account. This requires a more thorough knowledge of how best to engage with state actors without compromising commitments to independence and neutrality.

Focus on commonalities!

More mutual exchange among key actors about the specificities and challenges of 'the two worlds' and more focus on already existing common interests and commonalities between relief and development could foster joint action. Commonalities are mostly to be found at country level, often localised and close to the target populations. Decentralisation of decision-making is required.

One existing 'bridge' between the two policy fields are multi-mandated organisations with capacities for both relief and development, a long-term presence in the affected countries and a track record of cooperation with local organisations.

Take enough time and create enough space!

Systemic changes take time before they materialise on a sufficient scale. LRRD requires an on-going debate, further investments and practical experience in different contexts. Longer time frames of engagement are needed in order to implement existing policies and concepts at country level and to learn lessons. More systematic frameworks, platforms/ space and instruments for innovative collaboration could accelerate the change process. Formats and instruments for joint needs assessments, context analysis, strategic planning, joint actions and learning should be promoted further.

Annexes

Annex 1 About IOB

Objectives

The remit of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) is to increase insight into the implementation and effects of Dutch foreign policy. IOB meets the need for the independent evaluation of policy and operations in all the policy fields of the Homogenous Budget for International Cooperation (HGIS). IOB also advises on the planning and implementation of evaluations that are the responsibility of policy departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassies of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Its evaluations enable the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Cooperation to account to parliament for policy and the allocation of resources. In addition, the evaluations aim to derive lessons for the future. To this end, efforts are made to incorporate the findings of evaluations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' policy cycle. Evaluation reports are used to provide targeted feedback, with a view to improving the formulation and implementation of policy. Insight into the outcomes of implemented policies allows policymakers to devise measures that are more effective and focused.

Organisation and quality assurance

IOB has a staff of experienced evaluators and its own budget. When carrying out evaluations it calls on assistance from external experts with specialised knowledge of the topic under investigation. To monitor the quality of its evaluations IOB sets up a reference group for each evaluation, which includes not only external experts but also interested parties from within the ministry and other stakeholders. In addition, an Advisory Panel of four independent experts provides feedback and advice on the usefulness and use made of evaluations. The panel's reports are made publicly available and also address topics requested by the ministry or selected by the panel.

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Programming of evaluations

IOB consults with the policy departments to draw up a ministry-wide evaluation programme. This rolling multi-annual programme is adjusted annually and included in the Explanatory Memorandum to the ministry's budget. IOB bears final responsibility for the programming of evaluations in development cooperation and advises on the programming of foreign policy evaluations. The themes for evaluation are arrived at in response to requests from parliament and from the ministry, or are selected because they are issues of societal concern. IOB actively coordinates its evaluation programming with that of other donors and development organisations.

Approach and methodology

Initially IOB's activities took the form of separate project evaluations for the Minister for Development Cooperation. Since 1985, evaluations have become more comprehensive, covering sectors, themes and countries. Moreover, since then, IOB's reports have been submitted to parliament, thus entering the public domain. The review of foreign policy and a reorganisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1996 resulted in IOB's remit being extended to cover the entire foreign policy of the Dutch government. In recent years it has

extended its partnerships with similar departments in other countries, for instance through joint evaluations and evaluative activities undertaken under the auspices of the OECD-DAC Network on Development Evaluation.

IOB has continuously expanded its methodological repertoire. More emphasis is now given to robust impact evaluations implemented through an approach in which both quantitative and qualitative methods are applied. IOB also undertakes policy reviews as a type of evaluation. Finally, it conducts systematic reviews of available evaluative and research material relating to priority policy areas.

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Annex 3 Details about the Methodology

Literature research

The literature search comprised studies on humanitarian aid with reference to LRRD, connectedness, DRR, resilience and transition. The research first concentrated on the 'traditional literature' about LRRD (from the 1990s and onwards). It then also took into account more recent publications, policy documents and evaluations covering the years 2005 until today (post South-East Asia tsunami).

Sector-wide studies specifically dealing with LRRD have been analysed in depth. Examples are the Tsunami evaluation 'A ripple in development' and the 'State of the Humanitarian Systems Report' (SOHS).¹⁹⁴ Joint evaluations of major recent humanitarian crises have been included in the sample for an in-depth assessment as well (for example related to the Haiti earthquake response and to the Horn of Africa crisis). All together about 80 studies have been assessed (see also the bibliography).

Interviews

For this study interviews were conducted with staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague in autumn 2012. Informants comprised staff from the Directorate for Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid (*Directie Stabiliteit en Humanitaire Hulp*) as well as from other departments (e.g. Multilateral Organisations Department, Africa Department).

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Interviews with NGOs were included in order to capture the perspective of the recipient organisations. Interviews with the European Commission and selected European donors were conducted to get input from other donors regarding their perspectives on the state of the humanitarian system and challenges related to LRRD and solutions applied by these donors. For this purpose a number of existing policies, especially the Dutch, the British (2011), the German (2012) and the Swedish (2011-2014) humanitarian policies, were assessed regarding their reference to the concept of LRRD.

Expert meeting

An expert meeting was organised with the support of IOB in January 2013. It was an opportunity to present preliminary findings to an informed audience, to validate the main findings and to discuss requirements in order to respond to challenges in LRRD. Participants were selected so that the various contexts for LRRD and the diverse perspectives of the different actors in the field were included (donor representatives, UN, NGOs, independent researchers).

Different participatory methods were applied during the workshop including facilitated and documented plenary discussions and various forms of group work.

¹⁹⁴ <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/53/42911319.pdf>; www.alnap.org.

Persons interviewed in person or by phone

| Name, First Name | Organisation | Function |
|-------------------------------|---|---|
| Albert, Dominique | DG ECHO, European Commission | Unit A4 (specific thematic policies) |
| Andriessen, Joost | Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) Department of Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid (DSH) | Director |
| Bara, Luiza | DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid | Unit A5 – Fragility and Crisis Management Directorate A – EU development policy |
| Becking, Marnix | Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) Environment, Water, Climate and Energy Department (DME) | Environment and conflict, biodiversity, environment and forests |
| Brouwer, Eelko | Netherlands Red Cross | Advisor Disaster Management |
| Calon, Monique | Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) Sustainable Development Department (DDE) | Senior policy officer – Food Security, Resilience, Rural Development, Horn of Africa and Sahel |
| Rabesahala de Meritens, Jahal | UNDP | Coordinator, Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery, Early Recovery Partnership team, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery – UNDP, Geneva |
| Eliasson, Jessica | Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (Sida) | Specialist Humanitarian Affairs – Department for Conflict and Post-conflict Cooperation |
| Kamil, Sasja | Cordaid | Policy advisor in DRR team |
| Koeleman, Margriet | Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) Humanitarian Aid Division | Senior policy officer – UN reform, M&E, NGOs (cooperating humanitarian NGOs – SHO) |
| Leuverink, Inge | Cordaid | Policy advisor in emergency relief team |
| Peters, Marianne | Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) Multilateral Department | Senior policy officer – UNDP |
| Remijn, Jan | Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) Africa Department (DAF) | Senior policy officer – Mali, Burkina Faso |
| Rottier, Erik | Care Netherlands | Disaster Risk Reduction Coordinator |
| Soede, Sjarah | Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) Africa Department (DAF) | Senior policy officer – Somalia |
| Struijf, Margriet | Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) Humanitarian Aid Division | Deputy head of division and EU-HAC and NGOs in general |

| Name, First Name | Organisation | Function |
|-----------------------|--|---|
| Symoens, Chantal | DG Development & Cooperation – EuropeAid European Commission | Unit A5 – Fragility and Crisis Management Directorate A – EU development policy |
| Teunissen, Winnie | Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) Humanitarian Aid Division | Senior policy officer – DRR, European Disaster Response, IFRC/ICRC and NL Red Cross |
| van den Hoogen, Hans | Oxfam Novib | Manager Humanitarian Unit |
| van der Aa, Pauline | Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) Humanitarian Aid Division | Senior policy officer – Food Security, WFP and FAO |
| van Dijk, Anne Pieter | Oxfam Novib | Humanitarian coordinator |
| Volmer, Sophie | Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) Humanitarian Aid Division | Senior policy officer – DRR, Quality aspects (incl. ALNAP, HAP) |
| Waites, Tim | DFID | Humanitarian Disaster Reduction Policy Adviser |

Workshop participants

| Category | Name | Organisation | Function |
|-------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|---|
| Netherlands NGOs | Inge Leuvenink | Cordaid | Programme Officer Department of Emergency Aid & Reconstruction |
| | Hans van den Hoogen | Oxfam Novib | Manager Humanitarian & External Funding Units |
| | Piet Spaarman | Cordaid | Former director Cordaid in Haiti |
| | Bruno Haghebaert | Dutch Red Cross | DRR Focal Point |

| Category | Name | Organisation | Function |
|----------------------------|------------------------------|--|---|
| Donor country | Ruerd Ruben | Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Director, Policy and Operations Evaluation Department |
| | Monique Calon | Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Senior policy officer, Department of Stability and Humanitarian Aid (<i>inter alia</i> responsible for Food Security, Resilience, Rural Development, Horn of Africa and Sahel) |
| | Herwig Cleuren | Netherlands Court of Audit | Team leader of performance audit on rehabilitation/ reconstruction activities undertaken by Dutch NGOs in Haiti |
| | Margriet Koeleman | Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Senior policy officer, Department of Stability and Humanitarian Aid (<i>inter alia</i> responsible for EU, IASC, MDTFs, ALNAP, UN, etc.) |
| | Paul de Nooijer | Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Senior evaluator, Policy and Operations Evaluation Department |
| | Tanneke Vandersmissen | Netherlands Court of Audit | Team member of performance audit on rehabilitation / reconstruction activities undertaken by Dutch NGOs in Haiti |
| | Ronald Wormgoor | Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Senior Policy Advisor, Department of Stability and Humanitarian Aid |
| | Julia McCall | Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Researcher, Policy and Operations Evaluation Department |
| | Ted Kliet | Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Senior evaluator, Policy and Operations Evaluation Department |
| United Nations | Jahal Rabesahala de Meritens | UNDP | Coordinator, Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery, Early Recovery Partnership team, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery – UNDP, Geneva |
| European Commission | Luiza Bara | DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid | Senior staff member, Fragility and Crisis Management |

| Category | Name | Organisation | Function |
|---|--------------------|---|--|
| Researcher / independent consultant | Adriaan Ferf | Independent consultant / evaluator | Expert working in development and in humanitarian aid |
| | Silvia Hidalgo | Former director of Dara (Spanish independent non-profit organization focusing on humanitarian and post-conflict issues) | Expert in humanitarian aid and initiator of the Dara Humanitarian Aid Index |
| | François Grünewald | <i>Groupe Urgence, Réhabilitation Développement</i> – URD (French independent institute specializing on analysis of practice and development of humanitarian and post-crisis policies and strategies) | Director, <i>Groupe Urgence, Réhabilitation Développement</i> – URD and expert on LRRD |
| Consultants commissioned with the LRRD study / workshop facilitators | Lioba Weingärtner | Independent consultant / evaluator | Expert on humanitarian aid, development cooperation and LRRD |
| | Ralf Otto | Senior staff member, Channel Research, Belgium | Expert on humanitarian aid, LRRD and development issues |

Annex 4a Challenge Matrix

The following matrix lists the various identified challenges for good transition or linking relief, rehabilitation and development. The list has been established mainly based on desk research (literature and evaluations). The matrix also refers to five key concepts and shows to what extent these concepts respond to the identified challenges. The matrix can thus show the strength and weaknesses of each concept. Gaps can be identified. The list ends with preliminary conclusions.

| Challenge | EC Communication on LRRD | Resilience | Disaster Risk Reduction | Early Recovery | Fragile States Principles/ Transition Financing |
|--|--|---|--|--|---|
| Source(s)/main document(s) | EC Communications in 1996 and 2001 | Defining Disaster Resilience – A DFID Approach Paper, 2011 | Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005 | UNDP Policy on Early Recovery, 2008 | OECD/DAC Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations, 2007; OECD/INCAF Transition Financing – Building a better response, 2010 |
| 1. Definition challenge: What is humanitarian assistance/relief, what is rehabilitation, what is development; when does the one start and the other end; what is the “link” or the “transition”. ¹⁹⁵ | Not addressed by the concept. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Introduces a new (common) goal. Keeps definitions of humanitarian, development and transition. Does not clarify the definition problem. | Mainly addressing development cooperation (DRR as a cross-cutting issue) but also referring to humanitarian assistance. Does not address the definition problem as such. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not addressed directly. Clarifies that Early Recovery is not another phase. | Not addressed. |
| 2. The general concept challenge: Still too little understanding of the LRRD concept; continuum thinking still prominent and too little understanding of requirements for contiguum. | Name of the concept seems to reinforce the continuum thinking. | Concept of resilience addresses the issue. | Not addressed. | Although meant for sudden-onset and protracted crisis the concept seems to reinforce the linear thinking. | Promotes a non-linear approach and clearly stresses: “Transition processes are NOT clearly delineated periods but overlapping phases that are difficult to define.” |

¹⁹⁵ Link to no. 10, 12.

| Challenge | EC Communication on LRRD | Resilience | Disaster Risk Reduction | Early Recovery | Fragile States Principles/ Transition Financing |
|---|---|---|--|--|---|
| Source(s)/main document(s) | EC Communications in 1996 and 2001 | Defining Disaster Resilience – A DFID Approach Paper, 2011 | Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005 | UNDP Policy on Early Recovery, 2008 | OECD/DAC Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations, 2007; OECD/INCAF Transition Financing – Building a better response, 2010 |
| 3. The disconnect challenge: LRRD is discussed mainly at policy level but less dealt with at field level. Bureaucracies and globally acting organizations need to work with sector/technical specialisations and in a compartmentalised way (thematic departments, various budget lines, etc.). At field level these compartments as well as the need to include all cross-cutting issues and comprehensive approaches can be distracting. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EC's LRRD communications are high-level policy commitments. No practical guidelines given. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> High attention at policy level. Promotes shift of responsibilities from HQ to the field. “How to notes” and case studies exist in the case of DFID. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Concept receives high attention at policy level. Little funding to DRR initiatives. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Application at field level through clusters. Little application of the concept by NGOs. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mainly addresses funding organisations. Promotes shift of responsibilities from headquarters to the field. |
| 4. The needs assessment challenge ¹⁹⁶ : Different assessment and planning processes in development cooperation and in humanitarian assistance. Lack of common/joint context and needs analysis. Requirement for multi-actor and multi-sector assessments. | Context analysis and needs assessments not directly addressed in the concept. But part of discussion around country strategies. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gives common headline/goal that allows for common planning and a common framework. DFID: ‘Champion’ at national level commissioned to do analysis. | Encourages the assessment of risk factors. | Reference to Post Disaster Needs Assessments. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stresses importance of the context as the starting point. Call for timely, holistic and realistic needs assessments. |

¹⁹⁶ Link to no. 5 and no. 9.

| Challenge | EC Communication on LRRD | Resilience | Disaster Risk Reduction | Early Recovery | Fragile States Principles/ Transition Financing |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| Source(s)/main document(s) | EC Communications in 1996 and 2001 | Defining Disaster Resilience – A DFID Approach Paper, 2011 | Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005 | UNDP Policy on Early Recovery, 2008 | OECD/DAC Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations, 2007; OECD/INCAF Transition Financing – Building a better response, 2010 |
| 5. The joint framework challenge ¹⁹⁷ : Lack of joint or common strategic framework for development cooperation, reconstruction and humanitarian aid; multitude of actors (national and international), instruments and interests are difficult to align within one framework. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stresses importance for coordination. Specific suggestions for EC instruments only. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gives common headline/goal that allows for common planning and a common framework. Not yet clear to what extent this translates into specific intervention frameworks at country level. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Calls for an integrated multi-hazard approach for both development cooperation and humanitarian aid. Calls for national institutional and legislative frameworks for DRR. | Not directly addressed. | Promotes whole-of-government approach but no specific instrument/mechanism suggested. |
| 6. The funding challenge : different budget lines and instruments, also donor fatigue in case of long-lasting crises and limited funding (no single actor can cover the whole range of sectors and all needs); funding is still un-proportionately focussed on first response phase in sudden-onset disasters and this drives the entire response; multitude of funding instruments. | Concept addresses this issue and proposes changes for EC instruments. | Challenge is acknowledged but no specific solution proposed. | Calls for earmarked funding to DRR. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Refers to UNDP- and other specific funding mechanisms. Concept and early recovery clusters at country level are opportunities to raise awareness for funding needs and for for gap-filling. | Central to the guideline 'Transitional Financing'. |

¹⁹⁷ Link to no. 9.

| Challenge | EC Communication on LRRD | Resilience | Disaster Risk Reduction | Early Recovery | Fragile States Principles/ Transition Financing |
|---|--|---|---|--|--|
| Source(s)/main document(s) | EC Communications in 1996 and 2001 | Defining Disaster Resilience – A DFID Approach Paper, 2011 | Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005 | UNDP Policy on Early Recovery, 2008 | OECD/DAC Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations, 2007; OECD/INCAF Transition Financing – Building a better response, 2010 |
| 7. The exit challenge: Lack of appropriate exit strategies for humanitarian aid, lack of follow-up of proposed exit strategies, donor interest diminishes once the crisis is no longer in the centre of the (public) attention. | No explicit reference to exit strategies but recommends focus on core mandate for ECHO. | Concept does not look at exit strategies as such. | No explicit reference to exit strategies. | No explicit reference to exit strategies. | No explicit reference but promotes fast action and long-term engagement (10 year period). |
| 8. The imperative challenge: humanitarian imperative “forces” agencies to intervene, even if humanitarian aid interventions undermine development efforts; risks of aid dependency and humanitarian aid undermining development efforts: “working in “emergency mode” for too long (substitution rather than empowering/enabling). | Disturbing factors mentioned but no reference to humanitarian imperative. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disturbing factor is taken into account. “No harm to long-term perspective” is part of the UK Resilience working definition. | Not explicitly addressed. | Not explicitly addressed. | Not explicitly addressed. |
| 9. The coordination challenge: lack of coordination capacities and leadership for good LRRD; multi-dimensional and very diverse multi-actor coordination in post conflict settings (national, multi-national, Trust Funds, private sector). | Central to the concept but limited to commitment to coordination without further guidance. | Calls for better relationships between actors but no further focus on coordination. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Encourages cooperation. Structures exist such as UNISDR, GFDRR, Prevention Consortium. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Central to the concept as far as cluster coordination is concerned. Cluster approach applies to humanitarian aid. | Central to the concept with practical recommendations (for example joint offices, pooled funding). |

| Challenge | EC Communication on LRRD | Resilience | Disaster Risk Reduction | Early Recovery | Fragile States Principles/ Transition Financing |
|--|---|--|----------------------------------|--|--|
| Source(s)/main document(s) | EC Communications in 1996 and 2001 | Defining Disaster Resilience – A DFID Approach Paper, 2011 | Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005 | UNDP Policy on Early Recovery, 2008 | OECD/DAC Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations, 2007; OECD/INCAF Transition Financing – Building a better response, 2010 |
| 10. The timing challenge: transition from relief to rehabilitation comes too early or too late, ‘when can we enter rehabilitation and development?’; less room for individual decisions regarding timing because of requirement for coordinated and integrated approaches; humanitarian lobby for longer stay in order to secure funding. | Mentioned but not central to the concept. | Not addressed. | Not addressed. | Not addressed. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advocate for incentives for risk-taking in decision-making. • Call for clarification of responsibilities. |
| 11. The multi-tasking challenge: need to work interdisciplinary with a multi-sector approach vs. recent trend/demand in humanitarian assistance to specialise/ professionalise. | Not addressed. | Need is identified but no solution proposed. | Not addressed. | Early recovery identified as multi-sectoral process. | Not addressed. |
| 12. The principles challenge: challenge to discuss humanitarian aid with its principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality in the discussion around “Whole-of-government-approach”; aid effectiveness principles with focus on governance vs. GHD principles (incl. humanitarian principles). | Not addressed. | Not addressed. | Not addressed. | Not addressed. | Not addressed but focuses on state-building and calls for a whole-of government approach while “preserving the independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid”. |

Annex 4b Conclusions from the Challenge Matrix

The challenges are numerous. The list could probably even be extended. Some challenges are overlapping and some probably have the same origin. For example, the coordination challenge and the needs assessment challenge are both closely linked to the joint framework challenge. With one joint intervention framework at country level there could also be good potential for joint assessments and joint coordination.

Consequently a few challenges can be identified as central:

1. **Conceptual and definitional problem:** What is humanitarian assistance/relief, what is rehabilitation, what is development and what is the 'link' or the 'transition'?
→ This is central as the lack of understanding and the lack of clarity undermine concepts and approaches.
2. **Institutional gap:** Different budget lines, different departments (in national governments, donors and implementers), different actors (development and humanitarian partners).
→ This is central as it leads to 'the grey zone': needs that are outside the organisations'/institutions'/departments' mandates, for which there is no funding, and nobody is responsible.
3. **Joint framework challenge:** Lack of joint or common strategic framework for development cooperation, reconstruction and humanitarian aid; multitude of actors (national and international), instruments and interests are difficult to align within one framework.
→ This is central as it concerns other key challenges: the need for common/joint assessments, the need for coordination, the need for the division of labour and for clear allocation of responsibilities.
4. **Development and humanitarian aid are two worlds apart:** Different working cultures, different mandates, different principles, different languages, different rhythm/speed.
→ This is central as it undermines concepts, and discussions do not have a common starting-point.

These principle challenges are acknowledged and taken up by some of the concepts included in this study but not by all of them. None of the concepts cover all challenges. The main concepts appropriately address some of the key challenges:

- Needs assessments
- Joint framework

Some important challenges remain largely unaddressed:

- The definition challenge
- The disconnect challenge (field application)
- The exit challenge
- The timing challenge
- The capacity challenge (not addressed by any of the concepts)
- The principles challenge
- The quick fix challenge

Two frameworks appear to be more comprehensive than the other three. The OECD guidelines related to fragile states and transition address key challenges such as the general concept challenge, the funding challenge, the coordination challenge, the timing challenge and the quick fix challenge (at least to some extent). The guidelines, however, have the disadvantages that they are mainly donor-focussed and that they put a strong emphasis on state-building and thus cause problems regarding the humanitarian principles and the partners challenge (working with state-actors).

The resilience framework also appears to be comprehensive as it addresses the joint framework challenge, includes 'do no harm' which is related to the imperative challenge and – as the only concept – the early warning challenge. The concept is however still new and little evidence exists about its application and results at field level.

Annex 5a Main concepts

- LRRD (European Commission)
- Disaster Risk Reduction – DRR
- Early Recovery
- Fragile States Guidelines / Transition Financing
- Resilience

LRRD (European Commission)

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| Origin | European Commission (EC) Main EC Communications in 1996 and 2001 |
| Main idea | No blueprint solution but: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved coordination • Adjustment and streamlining of existing instruments and methods: e.g. increased speed and flexibility |
| Level of application | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The term LRRD became for many years a „brand name“ for the topic and the need to coordinate, to be flexible and timely is widely acknowledged. • Today the term LRRD is rarely used any more. |
| Comments | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sometimes LRRD is associated with „linear thinking“, which is not appropriate. • What does the new EC Communication on Resilience mean for LRRD? |

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Disaster Risk Reduction-DRR

| | |
|----------------------|---|
| Origin | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discussion since the 70s • High on agenda since World Conference on Disaster Reduction and Hyogo Framework for Action (2005) |
| Main idea | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Systematic approach to identifying, assessing and reducing the risks of disaster • Aims at minimizing vulnerabilities and disaster risks, to prevent or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards, within the broad context of sustainable development |
| Level of application | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commitment by almost any organisation • Some donors committed to fixed earmarked funding for DRR • Only 1% of ODA goes to DRR • Many organisations still in the process of rolling out the concept |
| Comments | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can be found both in humanitarian and in development programmes/institutions but often tied to humanitarian budgets • Overlap/shared goals with climate change adaptation |

Early Recovery

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| Origin | Introduced through humanitarian reform process in 2005 |
| Main idea | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Application of development principles in a humanitarian setting including national ownership, capacity building and participation • Focus on restoration of basic services and on the social, political and economic fabric of a society • Takes place in parallel to the humanitarian relief programmes • Crosscutting issue |
| Level of application | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP • Part of Cluster Approach (coordination) • Little application among NGOs |
| Comments | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Potential for “gap-filling” (e.g. for livelihoods, governance, infrastructure) but also overlap with <i>sectors / other clusters</i> and with inter-sector coordination has been identified (Cluster evaluations) • Link to post disaster needs assessment and CAP |

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
OECD Fragile States Guidelines/Transition Financing/ New Deal

| | |
|----------------------|---|
| Origin | Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) Years: Fragile States Guidelines: 2007, Transition Financing: 2010, New Deal 2011 |
| Main idea | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on state-building, prevention and long-term engagement • Coordination and clarification of responsibilities • Context specific and non-linear solutions at country level • Focus on donor engagement and financing |
| Level of application | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainly addressing peacebuilding actors • High level commitments at donor level • Little knowledge about application |
| Comments | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Little to no reference to humanitarian assistance • Focus on state-building and “the principles challenge” • Guidelines have high potential for LRRD |


Resilience

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| Origin | Since the 1960s; related to humanitarian aid since about 2008 |
| Main idea | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on ability to resist, recover from, or adapt to the effects of shocks or stresses • Focus on integrated approach • Resilience is supposed to be an outcome that can be measured and monitored • Supposed to help avoiding crisis and (expensive) humanitarian assistance. |
| Level of application | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High level policy commitment (“Resilience Champions”) • Country case studies undertaken with resilience approach • Increased appearance of resilience programming at field level |
| Comments | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Often seen as an opportunity to “work across silos” under one common goal. • Building resilience can mean many different things, to different groups of people. • Too early to see its effectiveness for LRRD. |


Annex 5b Selected visualisation of LRRD and related concepts



Source: URD Report




Source: OECD DAC




Source: UN

| 100 |



Source: DFID Approach Paper




Adapted from Montpellier Panel – "Growth with Resilience: Opportunities in African Agriculture", March 2012

Source: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The EU approach to resilience: Learning from food security crisis, COM(2012) 586 final

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Relief to Recovery to Development



Source: Presentation by Kiflemeriam Amdemariam, Senior Officer, Food Security, IFRC Secretariat, Geneva May 12, 2010

Annex 6 Examples from recent new donor policies and practices

European Commission

- **Political commitment:**
 - Various recent commitments: e.g. EU strategy for DRR in developing countries (2009) or “Agenda for Change” (2011)
 - 2012 Communication on resilience briefly refers to LRRD
- **Structure supporting LRRD:**
 - New unit ‘Fragility and Crisis Management’ within EuropeAid’s Directorate for EU Development Policy: providing analysis and policy formulation
 - Revived Transition Interservice Group: EuropeAid and DG ECHO (created in 2003)
- **Instruments supporting LRRD:**
 - Instrument for Humanitarian Aid with reference to long-term development objectives
 - New flexible regulations proposed for Development Cooperation Instrument
 - Food Security Thematic Programme and regulations for “exceptional situations of transitional and state fragility”
 - Instrument for Stability
 - Flexible “envelope” within European Development Fund (EDF)
- **Tools and Guidelines:**
 - Joint humanitarian-development framework
 - Work on operational guidelines for LRRD ongoing

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The Netherlands

- **Political commitment:**
 - 2011 Humanitarian Policy with focus on strengthening local capacity, transition, exit strategies, DRR and reconstruction
- **Structure supporting LRRD:**
 - One department for humanitarian assistance, stability, reconstruction
 - From thematic to geographical responsibility
 - Stronger regional coordination
 - Intensified inter-departmental dialogue
 - Stronger emphasize of ‘Whole of government approach’
- **Instruments supporting LRRD:**
 - Stability Fund for fragile countries (conflict related)
 - Reconstruction Fund (conflict related)
 - Multi-annual funding possible:
 - Country programmes funded by more than one budget line (e.g. Haiti, South Sudan)
 - Bi-annual NGO funding
 - Multi-annual commitments to CERF
- **Tools and Guidelines:**
 - -

Sweden

- **Political commitment:**
 - Sweden's policy for humanitarian assistance 2010-2016 commits to "development promoting" humanitarian assistance, transition and early recovery
 - Sida's 2008-2011 strategy for humanitarian assistance stresses flexibility and support to the transition to recovery and long-term development cooperation (incl. specific sub-goals and a reference to GHD principles).
- **Structure supporting LRRD:**
 - Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Humanitarian assistance is part of the department for multilateral development cooperation
 - Sida:
 - Humanitarian Assistance integrated into department 'conflict and post-conflict cooperation'
 - Joint humanitarian and development teams for fragile states
- **Instruments supporting LRRD:**
 - Combined development and humanitarian funding is possible, possible to use development budgets for early recovery
 - Multi-annual funding to implementing partners is possible (with funding levels set on an annual basis) and long-term perspectives are supported and encouraged
 - Multi-annual funding to Common Humanitarian Funds is possible
- **Tools and Guidelines:**
 - Annual country risk assessments in selected countries (since 2011)

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United Kingdom

- **Political commitment:**
 - Humanitarian policy goals: Anticipation and early action; build resilience to disasters and conflicts
 - Commitment to
 - improve coherence and links between development and humanitarian work
 - identify of innovative ways to close 'the gap'
 - 2011 Approach paper for resilience including humanitarian preparedness and response
- **Structure supporting LRRD:**
 - Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) includes 'Fragile States Team' since 2012
 - Country offices in lead and nominate champion for disaster resilience
 - Advisors at country level: Humanitarian, resilience, climate change advisors
 - Bi-annual high-level reporting on disaster resilience
- **Instruments supporting LRRD:**
 - Multi-annual framework contracts with NGOs possible: Partnership Programme Arrangements
 - Multi-annual funding to multi-lateral organisations is possible
- **Tools and Guidelines:**
 - Principles for enhancing disaster resilience (2011 Resilience Approach Paper)
 - Minimum standards for embedding disaster resilience in DFID country offices, incl.:
 - Multi-hazard risk assessments feed into national strategies
 - National strategies and plans for disaster resilience and emergency humanitarian response

Annex 7 Lessons from the South-East Asia tsunami¹⁹⁸

Context:

- One of the largest earthquakes ever recorded that prompted one of the largest humanitarian interventions ever.
- Comprehensive evaluations of LRRD in 2006 and in 2009.

What worked:

- Linkages have been most successful when the state was able to set clear policies and establish a coordinating presence in the disaster affected region, and where aid agencies were able to support the creation of a climate of trust.
- Multi-sector integrated approaches: gender empowerment, infrastructure and community mobilisation combined with good information to the population, and economic opportunities.

Where improvement was needed:

- Development planning with more structural involvement instead of considering the disaster affected areas to be recovery issues.
- Less focus of relief assistance on replacement of lost assets.
- Longer range programming in order to allow for:
 - relief and rehabilitation agencies to promote sustainable local initiatives;
 - capacity building which was the single most important aspect of efficient linkages.
- Less concentration of actors (donors, states, NGOs and UN agencies, civil society) on the achievement of their own institutional programme objectives achieved through projects.

¹⁹⁸ Brusset, E. et al. (2009).

Annex 8 Lessons from the Horn of Africa (focus on Ethiopia)

Context:

- There has been a drought somewhere in the Horn of Africa in eight of the past ten years.
- After the 2005/2006 drought international actors stayed engaged.
- In mid-2011 a severe drought affected the region threatening the lives and livelihood of almost 10 million people.

What worked in the response (in terms of LRRD):

- Existing programmes, mechanisms and partner relationships had positive impact and functioned as a basis for scaling up.
- Greater awareness for sustainable results and increased resilience.

Where improvement is needed (in terms of LRRD):

- Timing:
 - Early warning in place but mixed messages about quality and coverage of data.
 - Early action missing but challenging trade-off when it comes to advocacy for national ownership.
 - Late intervention results in 'life-saving imperative', which is costly and reduces room for more sustainable approaches.
- Follow an integrated, holistic 'landscape approach' with less focus on single sectors (in particular food assistance).
- Programmes need to be more transformative moving away from 'short-term-ism'.

Annex 9 Lessons from Haiti

Context:

- Long-term conflict context with weak national capacities, periodic occurrence of natural disasters (hurricanes), large-scale disaster (earthquake), cholera epidemic.
- In Haiti 'coordination' and 'transition' are grouped as one sector within the UN-managed coordination system.¹⁹⁹

What worked in the response (in terms of LRRD):

- Immediate needs were met (sometimes even exceeded) so that attention could shift away from life-saving.
- Awareness of need for long-term engagement right from the start.
- Better organised needs assessments after the relief phase was over.
- Reconstruction Action Plan and Recovery Commission were put in place.

Where improvement is needed (in terms of LRRD):

- Need to contribute to resilience and avoid negative influence of humanitarian assistance on resilience.
- Earlier shift from relief mode to development mode: e.g. capacity building, support to sustainable livelihood.
- Locally adapted standard in relief assistance so that continuity is possible.
- Integration of Haitians into response.
- Shift of decision-making to the crisis-affected country.
- Long-term plans need to be supported by commitments, agreed standards and subsequent funding.

¹⁹⁹ Haiti Humanitarian Action Plan (2013): <http://fts.unocha.org>.

Annex 10 Stability Funds

Examples for stability funds with relevance for LRRD:

- UK's Conflict Prevention Pool
- UN Peacebuilding Fund
- World Bank State and Peacebuilding Fund
- EU Instrument for Stability
- Denmark's Stabilisation Fund
- Netherlands' Stability Fund
- Canada's General Peace and Security Fund


Large proportions of these funds go to South and Central Asia (which include Afghanistan and Pakistan) and sub-Saharan Africa.²⁰⁰ Most of these funds operate on a multi-year basis. They do however normally not support humanitarian activities directly as they tend to focus on the later stages of a war-to-peace transition. Some of these funds aim to support early recovery activities.²⁰¹

²⁰⁰ <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org> (figures from 2011).

²⁰¹ For details see: Boyce and Forman 2010.

Annex 11 Fragmentation of funding instruments and programmes in Southern Sudan

Figure 4. Fragmentation of funding instruments and programmes in Southern Sudan



Source: OECD DAC INCAF Guidelines Transition Financing: Building a better response, 2010, page 6

Annex 12 The European Development Fund's B-Envelope

The European Development Fund (EDF), foresees €1.8 billion for unforeseen needs. €601 million were initially allocated to national envelopes. In order to respond quickly to crisis situations and emergency assistance needs, 25% of the allocations for unforeseen needs were earmarked for ECHO use and mobilised by ECHO in coordination with DEVCO to respond to humanitarian needs in accordance with humanitarian aid principles and procedures. The mechanism for mobilisation by ECHO allows the EDF to provide a quick response to crisis/transition situations that has proved very effective under the 10th EDF.

National B-envelopes have largely been used. Over the last three years, they have been mobilised in more than 30 countries, and even exhausted for a quarter of the ACP countries (Burkina Faso, Togo, Kiribati, Salomon Islands...). A particular feature is that it is often the same countries that need such funds for unforeseen needs, for many of them because of their high exposure to natural disasters.

The flexibility offered by the EDF has proved useful to respond to recent crises as well as small or medium-scale unforeseen developments at national level. For disasters of a very large magnitude however, the initial programming (NIP) usually has to be revised to adapt to the new circumstances and priorities on the ground and the B-envelope is only used, if at all, for the initial emergency assistance (which is also financed by the humanitarian assistance funds under the budget).

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The B-envelope reserve at the level of the entire EDF has also been used, in accordance with the Cotonou agreement, to finance the Flex mechanism to mitigate the adverse effects of fluctuations in export earnings, as well as for the V-Flex to limit the impact of the international economic and financial crisis.

Annex 13 EC initiative ‘Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience (SHARE)’

The EC’s SHARE initiative responds to the 2011 Horn of Africa food crisis. The aim is to support resilience by, among others, building on emergency interventions, addressing recovery from drought and by strengthening the livelihood opportunities of agro-pastoral communities.

SHARE’s ‘recovery’ phase is supposed to prepare for long-term development support in the entire Horn of Africa. SHARE wants to improve, for example, land resource management and income opportunities for nomadic populations. Another objective is to improve the management of malnutrition cases and look at durable solutions for protracted refugees and uprooted populations within countries and the region.

The initiative consists of a joint humanitarian-development approach including funding of €270 million for Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Somalia. SHARE receives funding from different budget lines: the Instrument for Stability, the Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP) and the EDF 10th reserve.²⁰²

²⁰² European Commission Decision 1.8.2012, ‘The financing of humanitarian actions in the Horn of Africa from the 10th European Development Fund (EDF)’ (ECHO/-HF/EDF/2012/01000).

Annex 14 IASC Needs Assessment Task Force

In 2009, the IASC Working Group created the IASC Needs Assessment Task Force (NATF)²⁰³. One of the reasons for starting this initiative was the identified 'limited common understanding of the different phases of an emergency, including the interface between the humanitarian and early recovery phases.'²⁰⁴

The objective of the group is to harmonise and promote cross-sector needs assessments. Among others the group aims at developing an overall assessment framework including the interface to early recovery. The Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS) has been created to improve the assessment of needs in complex emergencies and crises.²⁰⁵

²⁰³ <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org>.

²⁰⁴ IASC Task force on Needs Assessment, Terms of Reference, 2009.

²⁰⁵ www.acaps.org.

Evaluation reports of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) published 2008-2013

Evaluation reports published before 2008 can be found on the IOB website:
www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations.

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Front cover: Zimbabwean girl observing a food distribution at a primary school that urgently needed rehabilitation in order to operate.

Page 20: Camp of internally displaced persons, Eastern DR Congo (Masisi territory, North Kivu province).

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The need to link relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) has been discussed for decades. Yet, in practice, there is little updated analysis available on the topic and many fundamental challenges still remain today. Building mainly on existing evaluations and research, as well as on interviews with a range of experts in this field, the study discusses the

different challenges to linking humanitarian aid to development. It also looks at how these challenges are being addressed by the current discourses on LRRD. The study aims to contribute to the further development of the concept of LRRD as well as to future evaluations on humanitarian aid.

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